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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence
regulating the eyewitness identifications used in tens of thousands of
criminal cases each year is not just flawed, but backwards. The
Court's highly deferential due process test uses factors that have been
*
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the subject of longstanding legal and scientific criticism.1 In this
Article, I argue that the test has a different fundamental flaw. While
ostensibly focused on the problem of reliability, the Court's test, as
interpreted under a well-established line of cases, encourages the
judge to admit the least reliable evidence: an eyewitness identification
in the courtroom. In the courtroom, there is no lineup. It is all too
obvious who the defendant is, sitting at counsel's table. Yet, as Justice
William Brennan wrote, "[T]here is almost nothing more convincing
than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the
defendant, and says 'That's the one!'"2
An irony of modern constitutional criminal procedure is that in
the one area in which the Court intervened specifically to improve the
reliability of trial evidence it may have permitted the opposite result.
Much of constitutional criminal procedure seeks to regulate the
fairness of criminal trials through procedural rights such as the right
to counsel, the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right to not
incriminate oneself, the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence, or
the right to a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, issues relating to the accuracy and reliability of evidence are
not usually of constitutional import and are typically left to state
3
evidence law and the trial judge's discretion.
The Court's eyewitness jurisprudence is different. In its
historic 1977 ruling in Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court emphasized
that "reliability is the linchpin" for evaluating eyewitness
identification procedures. 4 The Court adopted two approaches to
regulating identifications. The first, adopted in 1967's United States v.
Wade, was a typical criminal procedure approach that recognized a

1.
See, e.g., Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited:
Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 122-26 (2006); Charles A. Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The
Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1097,
1104-10 (1974); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with

PretrialIdentification Procedures:An Analysis and a Proposal to Return to the Wade Trilogy's
Standard, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 275-97 (1991); Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to
Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 870 (2007); David E. Paseltiner, Note,

Twenty-Years of DiminishingProtection: A Proposal to Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards,
15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 589-90 (1987); Dori Lynn Yob, Comment, Mistaken Identifications

Cause Wrongful Convictions: New Jersey's Lineup Guidelines Restore Hope, but Are They
Enough?, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213, 229-31 (2002).
2.
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original omitted) (quoting ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979)).
3.
Bill Stuntz has most prominently criticized the priority of procedure over substance in
modern criminal procedure. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedureand Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 37-45 (1997).
4.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
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procedural right to counsel at postindictment lineups. 5 The second,
adopted in Manson, barred unduly suggestive identification
techniques if the identification was also deemed unreliable.
The Court's reliability-based due process test was on a collision
course with reality. When Manson was decided, social scientists had
just embarked on a course of experimental research that would
revolutionize our understanding of human memory. As John Monahan
has observed, of "all the substantive uses [of] social science in law...
nowhere is there a larger body of research than in the area of
eyewitness identification. '6 Social scientists showed how memory is
not like a videotape, but rather is constructed in a dynamic fashion.
As a result, commonly used identification procedures can distort
memory and can even produce false identifications. Following the
Manson test, a judge may excuse the most blatant coaching of an
eyewitness by citing to "reliability" factors. Yet, social scientists
showed that the factors judges use do not correspond with reliability.
For example, one factor, eyewitness confidence, is not a sign of
reliability, but it is highly malleable and may be the product of police
suggestion. 7 Even modestly comforting feedback after the
identification, like telling an eyewitness, "Good, you identified the
suspect," can make the eyewitness far more confident.8
In the decades after Manson was decided, hundreds of
individuals would be convicted based on eyewitness identifications,
but these individuals would later be proven innocent by DNA testing.
Those high-profile wrongful convictions made the dangers of
eyewitness misidentifications more salient than ever before. 9 In a
5.
6.
LARRY

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); see infra Part I.B.
See GEOFFREY GAULKIN, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: STATE OF NEW JERSEY V.
E.
HENDERSON
9
(2010) [hereinafter
HENDERSON REPORT],
available at

http://www.judiciary.state.nj .us/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20BRIEF%20.PDF%20(0062
1142).PDF (the New Jersey Supreme Court instructed a special master to consider "the current
validity of our state law standards on the admissibility of eyewitness identification' ").
7.
See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 63-72 (2011).

8. See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect" Feedback to
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360,
360 (1998).
9.
For example, the Department of Justice convened in 1998 a task force that played a
crucial role in creating awareness about the need to adopt sound eyewitness identification
procedures. The report cited as its impetus both a "growing body" of social science research and
"[riecent cases in which DNA evidence has been used to exonerate individuals convicted
primarily on the basis of eyewitness testimony." See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TECHNICAL
WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, NCJ 178240, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS: A

GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, at iii(1999), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffflesl/nij/
178240.pdf ("Recent cases in which DNA evidence has been used to exonerate individuals
convicted primarily on the basis of eyewitness testimony have shown us that eyewitness evidence
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recent book, I present a study exploring the role that eyewitness
evidence played in the trials of the first 250 DNA exonerees. 10 Just as
social scientists would have predicted, the vast majority were
convicted following suggestive identification procedures and initially
uncertain eyewitnesses became absolutely certain by the time of
trial.1 1 If jurors had fully appreciated how tentative those
eyewitnesses were initially and the potential impact of suggestive
procedures, they might not have so readily convicted the defendants.
Responding to these developments, there has been a
nationwide movement to reform criminal procedure to promote greater
accuracy and to prevent wrongful convictions. 12 The Supreme Court
has taken note of, but has not responded to, these developments; in its
recent decision in Perry v. New Hampshire, the Justices showed little
interest in thinking about the due process test, much less rethinking
it.13 That case did not involve a lineup, but rather a situation in which
police claimed they did not intentionally arrange a one-on-one
identification. Most troubling, though was that the majority opinion
suggested, in ruling that the Manson test did not apply, that
eyewitness testimony did not deserve different treatment than other
forms of potentially unreliable evidence. The Court noted that "all incourt identifications" involve "some elements of suggestion," but
suggested that such "potential unreliability" does not counsel
additional due process regulation. 14 On the other hand the Court
emphasized: "We do not doubt either the importance or the fallibility
of eyewitness identifications."15 Eyewitness evidence poses a unique
problem in that jurors see a seemingly powerful but suggestive incourt identification, while standard tools like cross-examination
cannot show how the very memory of an eyewitness may have been
altered by unsound identification procedures; Justice Sotomayor
countered in dissent that suggestion impairs "meaningful crossexamination."'1 6 The majority did, however, suggest that careful jury
instructions and expert testimony are important "safeguards" in the

is not infallible."). See generally JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE AND
THE BATT'LE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION, at xi-xiii (2005).

10. GARRETT, supra note 7, at 45-83.
11. See id. at 48; infra Part I.D.
12. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, JudgingInnocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 122-25 (2008)
(describing reforms advanced and adopted to improve accuracy in criminal investigations and
prosecutions).
13. 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
14. Id. at 727.
15. Id. at 728.
16. Id. at 732 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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States. 17 Law enforcement, state courts and legislatures do not have
the luxury of remaining aloof from the problem, since they confront
the consequences of eyewitness misidentifications first-hand. Many
have improved their identification procedures. 18 Some states and
many more local jurisdictions have adopted double-blind lineups,
which psychologists have long recommended. 1 9 In a double-blind
lineup, the officer does not know which person is the suspect, and the
eyewitness is told that the officer does not know. That simple
procedure can effectively prevent suggestion from contaminating
identifications. An important field study has also now confirmed the
advantage of conducting identification procedures in a sequential
20
fashion so that images are shown to the subject one at a time.
However, the Court's interventions, intended to modestly improve
accuracy, may now perversely undermine such reforms.
What happens if the police do not follow best practices, and the
police fail to use, say, a double-blind lineup? At that point, the
question for a judge is whether to exclude that identification or to
admit it. Yet, a judge may exclude the prior identification but still
allow the eyewitness to identify the defendant in the courtroom. As I
will develop, state courts have used "independent source" rules to
allow courtroom identifications despite inadmissible out-of-court
identifications by the same eyewitness. These rules have gone largely
unnoticed by scholars but have been adopted almost universally. 21 In
17. Id. at 729.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part I.C (discussing this practice and other recommendations).
20. See GARY L. WELLS, MANCY K. STEBLAY & JENNIFER E. DYSART, AM. JUDICATURE SOCY,
A TEST OF THE SIMULTANEOUS VS. SEQUENTIAL LINEUP METHODS, at x (2011), available at
www.ajs.org/wc/pdfs/EWID-PrintFriendly.pdf (finding that using a sequential procedure, rather
than simultaneous, reduces mistaken identifications with little or no reduction in accurate
identifications).
21. No one has carefully examined state and federal rulings adopting this so-called
"independent source" or "independent reliability" test for admitting subsequent or in-court
eyewitness identifications. The leading practice guide to eyewitness testimony provides the only
account of the doctrine of independent source as a more general "pivotal strategic problem," and
briefly discusses the "extraordinary lengths" courts may go to admit in-court identifications. See
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E. DYSART, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL § 8-18 (4th ed. 2007) ("[C]ourts have gone to truly extraordinary lengths to accept
very limited opportunities to observe independent sources."). I have located two scholars who
have written about the potential danger of such rulings. Sandra Guerra Thompson, in an
important article on the role of state courts in reforming criminal procedure more generally,
discusses such decisions in several states. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Eyewitness
Identifications and State Courts as GuardiansAgainst Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 603, 628-31 (2010). Katherine Kruse, in an insightful analysis of reform efforts in Wisconsin,
cites to the potential corrosive effect of such "independent source" rules. See Katherine R. Kruse,
Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment, 2006 WiS. L. REV. 645,
722 n.367. Moreover, very few commentators have discussed in-court identifications generally.
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no uncertain terms, judges explain that they allow the courtroom
identification because of the "independent" memory that the
eyewitness supposedly has from the time of the crime.
This pernicious doctrine of "independent source" came from a
conflation of the two separate strands in the Court's eyewitness
identification jurisprudence. It was misappropriated from Sixth
Amendment rulings on a right to counsel at a preindictment lineup.
Indeed, the doctrine had its origins in Fourth Amendment search and
seizure law. 22 The concept of an independent source then found its
way into cases ostensibly dealing with the substantive issue of the
reliability of an identification. Had lower courts properly understood
the Supreme Court's due process cases, to say nothing of the social
science research on eyewitness memory, they would not so liberally
allow courtroom identifications. By contrast, evidence law has, in its
way, long recognized that the drama of a courtroom identification
should not supplant prior identification procedures intended to test an
eyewitness's memory. Courts have permitted the introduction of outof-court identifications as a special hearsay exception precisely
because they are far more reliable than courtroom identifications that
may just confirm what came before. 23 From not only a social science
perspective, but also an evidence law perspective, the regulation of
eyewitness identifications has it backwards.
At a time when the Supreme Court has eroded the strength of
the exclusionary rule for procedural violations, in particular search
and seizure violations, 24 and has held reliability is not of due process
concern if police did not "arrange" an eyewitness identification, 25 we
should reconsider the path not taken: exclusionary rules to promote
substantive reliability. In the eyewitness context, criminal procedure
rules could be revisited to reverse the focus of exclusion. I propose a
partial exclusion approach. Exclusion is a blunt instrument. Judges

Infra note 44. But see LoFTUS ET AL., supra, §8-17(d) (advising lawyers on how to best litigate an
in-court identification).
22. I have found one reference, in a state practice guide, to the questionable origins of this
so called "independent" analysis. See 41 GEORGE E. Dix & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, TEXAS PRACTICE:
CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 14.39 (2d ed. 2001) ("The Texas case law shows some
tendency to interject independent source considerations into analysis of defendants' due process
claims. This unfortunately confuses the differences between the two constitutional concerns at
issue ....").Few judges have noted the flaws in such an approach, although a few dissenting
judges have done so. See infra notes 134-35.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) (stating hearsay exception for prior statement that is
"one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person").
24. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) (holding exclusionary rule
did not apply to warrantless arrest caused by negligent police recordkeeping error).
25. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 730 (2012).
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are understandably reluctant to completely exclude the testimony of a
key eyewitness, perhaps the victim of a serious crime. That evidence
may be crucial to maintaining a criminal prosecution. Today courts
almost always allow courtroom identifications, but they sometimes bar
prior identifications. Instead, courts should per se exclude courtroom
identifications if there was a prior identification, but they should
sometimes admit out-of-court identifications. The result will
encourage greater attention to procedures used out-of-court, when the
eyewitness's memory was most fresh, reliable, and accurate.
I am not sanguine that this change will occur, given careless
judicial rulings and, as a result, limited incentives of defense counsel
to properly litigate these issues. However, improved eyewitness
procedures are increasingly required by state courts and statutes.
Directing my observations to criminal procedure reformers, I argue
that courtroom identifications following prior identifications should be
per se excluded. 26 More broadly, eyewitness identification testimony
should be regulated by factors informed by social science. First and
foremost, jurisdictions should ensure that proper identification
procedures are conducted in the first instance. Second, they should
task judges with evaluating reliability of the evidence at hearings
pretrial based on a social science framework and not the Manson test,
and then at trial, if identification evidence is admitted, providing
detailed instructions to educate jurors. Social scientists have for some
time outlined best practices for conducting sound identification
procedures, and as a second step, the Henderson decision in New
Jersey provides an early model for a framework to govern the use of
eyewitness evidence in court.2 7 Finally, I suggest that an accuracyoriented approach to regulation of criminal trial evidence has broader
applications for criminal procedure and for future scholarship.
I. EYEWITNESS PROCEDURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

A. Eyewitness IdentificationProcedures
Each year as many as 80,000 eyewitnesses (and perhaps many
more) make identifications of suspects in criminal investigations. We
do not have adequate information about how many eyewitnesses make
identifications of suspects, how many do not, and what happens in the

26.
27.

See infra Part III.B.
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); see infra Part I.C.
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cases where eyewitnesses do make identifications. 28 Eyewitnesses can
be crucial evidence of guilt in robbery, assault, rape, and other
commonly prosecuted offenses. How do police determine whether an
eyewitness can identify a culprit? Police know full well that
eyewitness memory is fallible, just as judges, lawyers, and social
scientists have long known this fact. 29 Police try to test the
eyewitness's memory. Police use a range of techniques. If a suspect is
found shortly after the crime, police may present that suspect to the
eyewitness directly. Such a one-on-one procedure, called a showup, is
inherently suggestive. Police may use such a procedure only in the
hours immediately following an incident, in order to quickly identify
the perpetrator or rule out the suspect and continue their
investigation. 30 Showups are particularly risky for the police. Because
there are no fillers, or other known-innocent people included in
addition to the suspect, a mistake is more likely to result in the
witness identifying an innocent person as the guilty party. And if the
eyewitness is unsure, there is a greater risk that a guilty person might
31
not be identified.
If police do not immediately locate a suspect, they may try to
show an eyewitness books or computerized collections of mug shots. If

28. Alvin G. Goldstein, June E. Chance & Gregory R. Schneller, Frequency of Eyewitness
Identification in Criminal Cases: A Survey of Prosecutors, 27 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 71, 73
(1989). That survey is now dated, but hopefully new efforts to survey police and prosecutors will
provide more complete data.
29. See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 367 (1932) (describing how,
in the first collection of accounts of "criminal prosecutions and convictions of completely innocent
people," that "[p]erhaps the major source of these tragic errors is an identification of the accused
by the victim of a crime of violence"); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30
(1927) ("The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy."); HUGO MUNSTERBERG,
ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME 39, 50-69 (1908) (describing early
psychological research on malleability and unreliability of eyewitness memory); see also WELLS
ET AL., supra note 20, at 16 (noting a thirty-one percent rate of filler identifications).
30. Cf. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 131 & n.ll (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that "the greatest memory loss occurs within hours after an event" and citing a holding
from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that a showup four hours after the crime
was not permissible); Jessica Lee, Note, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects
from the Consequences of Non-Exigent Show-ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 755, 759-62
(2005) ("Unlike 'stationhouse' show-ups, show-ups conducted in the field are often admissible due
to their spatial and temporal proximity to the crime.").
31. See Richard Gonzalez, Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Maceo Pembroke, Response Biases in
Lineups and Showups, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (1993) (finding subjects tested
with showups only identified the perpetrator thirty percent of the time whereas when tested
with lineups they correctly identified the perpetrator sixty-seven percent of the time). In
addition, "there is clear evidence that showups are more likely to yield false identifications than
are properly constructed lineups." See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads," 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 630-31 (1998)
(citing multiple sources).
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that also fails, police may ask the witness to work with a police sketch
artist or with a computer program to generate a composite image that
can be used in "wanted" postings. When police eventually locate a
suspect, they conduct an identification procedure to test the
eyewitness's memory. In a live lineup, a suspect stands in a row of
"filler" individuals and the witness looks at the group from behind
one-way glass. In the past few decades, police have mostly stopped
using live lineups because it is so difficult and time-consuming to find
people who look similar to a suspect. Instead, they use photo arrays,
typically a standard set of six photos (called a "six-pack"). 32
Procedures for creating photo arrays and conducting lineups
were traditionally passed on by senior officers through word of mouth.
Although police departments have detailed procedures, manuals, and
training on a host of subjects-ranging from traffic stops to use of
force-many, if not most, police departments still do not have any
written procedures or formal training on how to conduct lineups or
photo arrays. Perhaps, however, this is starting to change in reaction
to high-profile eyewitness misidentifications. 33 Unfortunately, archival

32. See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures
and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 1, 16 (2009) (stating that a 'large percentage of jurisdictions in the U.S. use only
photographs and never use live lineups").
33. Few surveys of police policies have been conducted, although one national is currently
in progress. See Erica Goode & John Schwartz, Police Lineups Start to Face Facts: Eyes Can Lie,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/us/29witness.html? r=l&scp
=1&sq=police%201inups%20start%20to%20face%20facts&st=cse
(noting
that
the
Police
Executive Research Forum has begun a survey on the topic from 1,400 randomly selected police
departments). Separate questions remain as to compliance with written policies, even if they do
reflect best practices on paper. Id. ("[Elven in departments that have enacted changes, police
officers sometimes fail to comply with the new procedures."). A prior national survey with
responses from 220 of 500 departments found that seventy-four percent of officers learned how to
handle lineups from another officer, forty-four percent from court rulings and case law, forty-two
percent from course work or professional instruction, while eighteen percent cited to learning
from specific rules and regulations and thirty-one percent from general written guidelines.
Michael S. Wogalter, Roy S. Malpass & Dawn E. McQuiston, A National Survey of U.S. Police on
Preparationand Conduct of Identification Lineups, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 69, 72 (2004). In
addition, most officers (fifty-eight percent) reported a lack of "formal training in eyewitness
identification techniques." Id. at 79. Single-state surveys have been conducted. For example, a
survey by the Virginia Crime Commission found that at least twenty-five percent of departments
still had no written policy on the subject-despite enactment of legislation five years earlier
requiring that some form of written procedure be adopted. See Chelyen Davis, Panel Head
Favors New Rules on Police Lineups, FREE LANCE-STAR (Fredericksburg, Va.), Sept. 9, 2010,
http://fredericksburg.comNewsFLS/2010/092010/09092010/574245.
A
survey of lineup
procedures in Texas found only twelve percent of responding departments had any written
policies; legislation requiring written policies was subsequently enacted. See Tony Plohetski,
Police Pen New Rules for Photo Lineups, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 8, 2009, at Al.
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studies also suggest that unnecessary showups are quite common
34
together with other flawed identification procedures.
If there is a trial, identifications may occur in court. The
courtroom identification is obviously highly suggestive. The defendant
is sitting at the counsel's table, perhaps in prison clothing. There are
no fillers and there is no lineup. And the identification may follow
emotionally charged testimony by the victim describing a crime-a
victim who, in the conclusion of the testimony, points out the culprit to
the jury. 35 The courtroom identification may simply serve to confirm
what came before. The procedures that came before may have been
suggestive or shoddy. The eyewitness may have previously been
uncertain. But in court, the eyewitness may appear supremely
confident and will have no trouble picking out the defendant and
pointing him out to the jury. As the Tenth Circuit has explained:
Because the jurors are not present to observe the pretrial identification, they are not
able to observe the witness making that initial identification. The certainty or hesitation
of the witness when making the identification, the witness's facial expressions, voice
inflection, body language, and the other normal observations one makes in everyday life
when judging the reliability of a person's statements, are not available to the jury
during this pretrial proceeding. There is a danger that the identification in court may
only be a confirmation of the3 6earlier identification, with much greater certainty
expressed in court than initially.

Judges could strictly regulate courtroom identifications in
several ways. First, they could insist that police conduct a proper
lineup before trial, out of the courtroom. Police can demand that a
defendant participate in a lineup. However, judges are often reluctant
to order police to conduct a lineup when police or prosecutors decline
37
to do so, citing to the absence of a constitutional right to a lineup.
34. Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal
Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 479 (2001) (noting that in 271 cases
analyzed, 258 field showups were used; however, multiple showups could occur in each case);
Gonzalez et al., supra note 31, at 535 ("In our sample showup identifications were over three
times more common than lineups, and follow-up research currently underway in Washington and
Michigan suggests that showups are frequently used."); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial
Blindness To Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 639, 646 (2009) ("[Slhow-ups
constitute one of the most commonly used identification procedures.").
35. See Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 450-52 (2009)
(describing how eyewitness identifications are litigated in criminal cases).
36. United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 1318, 1323 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986)).
37. See, e.g., People ex rel. Blassick v. Callahan, 279 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill.
1972) ("We have
specifically rejected the contention that on [sic] in-court identification of an accused without a
lineup denies due process of law."); People v. Bradley, 546 N.Y.S.2d 437, 437 (App. Div. 1989) ("A
criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to participate in a lineup whenever he
requests one."); People v. Grady, 506 N.Y.S.2d 922, 932 (Sup. Ct. 1986) ("[1]t is undisputed that
there is no constitutional requirement that a defense-requested in-court lineup be conducted.").
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Second, judges could also require the use of a lineup in the
courtroom in order to make the courtroom identification a more
meaningful test of the eyewitness's memory. Courts rarely require the
use of such "special procedures," however, though they are more
willing to do so where the eyewitness had never been asked to view a
lineup before trial.38 Courts generally reject arguments that in-court
identifications are inherently suggestive. 39 Judges may reject requests
by defense lawyers to order a double-blind lineup. 40 Judges may view
the courtroom identification as pure theater or a witness
demonstration, but, as we will see, they also seem to think that the
presence of counsel and the solemnity of testimony under oath in a
courtroom makes the courtroom identification more, not less, reliable.
Acting on their own initiative, defense lawyers have sometimes
tried to make the courtroom identification a real memory test.
Enterprising defense lawyers have seated people who looked like the
defendant next to them or have seated the defendant out in the
courtroom. Under these circumstances, eyewitnesses were unable to
identify the defendant. 41 Judges have responded harshly. The Second
Circuit called substituting the position of the defendant without
permission of the judge a "trick" that could be subject to bar
discipline. 42 The Ninth Circuit approved a criminal contempt
But see Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 625 (1974) ("[D]ue process requires ... that an
accused, upon timely request therefor [sic], be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to
the alleged criminal conduct can participate ... when eyewitness identification is shown to be a
material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a
lineup would tend to resolve.").
38. United States v. Archibald, 756 F.2d 223, 223 (2d Cir.1984) ("[S]pecial procedures are
necessary only where (1) identification is a contested issue; (2) the defendant has moved in a
timely manner prior to trial for a lineup; and (3) despite that defense request, the witness has
not had an opportunity to view a fair out-of-court lineup prior to his trial testimony or ruling on
the fairness of the out-of-court lineup has been reserved."). Such procedures are within the
discretion of the trial court. Domina, 784 F.2d at 1369.
39. See Evan J. Mandery, Legal Development: Due Process Considerations of In-Court
Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV. 404-09; see also State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 189, 193 (Conn. 1986)
('We know of no authority which would prohibit, as unduly suggestive, an exclusively in-court
identification." (quoting Mangrum v. State, 270 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)).
40. People v. Martinez, Nos. 6403/01, 6402/01, 2001 WL 1789315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 28,
2001).
41. People v. Gow, 382 N.E.2d 673, 675 (111. App. 1978) (describing how eyewitness
identified person seated next to defense counsel); Fredric D. woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes
Deceive You? Expert PsychologicalTestimony on the Unreliabilityof Eyewitness Identification, 29
STAN. L. REV. 969, 969 n.3 (1977) ("A judge in New York City developed his own system to check
on the frequency of mistaken identifications. In ten cases in which the identification of the
accused was virtually the only evidence, the judge permitted defense attorneys to seat a lookalike alongside the defendant. In only two of the ten cases was the witness able to identify the
defendant.").
42. United States v. Sabater, 830 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1987).
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conviction for doing so, calling the conduct "unprofessional" but also
an "actual obstruction of justice." Several state courts have followed
43
suit.
In contrast, certain evidentiary rules recognize the inherent
limitations
of courtroom identifications
preceded by prior
identifications. For routine identifications of documents or
acquaintances, there would be no reason to have tested the witness's
memory using a lineup. However, for stranger identifications, police
will typically have conducted a prior identification to test the witness's
memory. Those prior identifications will generally be admissible. This
is because the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize prior
identifications as a special hearsay exception, for the reason that they
are understood to be far more reliable than courtroom identifications.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(D)(1)
explain, "The basis [for the hearsay exception] is the generally
unsatisfactory and inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications as
compared with those made at an earlier time under less suggestive
conditions." 44 While traditionally such out-of-court prior statements
were treated as hearsay, the modern rule is to admit them, and nearly
all states that previously did not admit them changed their rules in
45
response to the 1975 federal revisions.
The Senate Report ("the Report") noted three reasons
supporting the modern rule. First, the Report repeated the reliability
concern cited by the Advisory Committee: "Since these identifications
take place reasonably soon after an offense has been committed, the
witness'[s] observations are still fresh in his mind. The identification
occurs before his recollection has been dimmed by the passage of

43. United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1981); see People v. Simac,
641 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. 1994) (affirming conviction for direct criminal contempt of attorney who
substituted the position of the defendant without permission from the judge); Miskovsky v. State
ex rel. Jones, 586 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (explaining source of the contempt
finding was counsel's failure to gain permission from the court before substituting another
person for the defendant). Interestingly, one judge dissented in the Illinois case, stating, "After a
thorough review of the record, I believe that defense counsel was acting in good faith to protect
his client from a suggestive in-court identification." Simac, 641 N.E.2d at 424 (Nickels, J.,
dissenting).
44. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) (hearsay exclusion for prior statement that is "one of
identification of a person made after perceiving the person."); see also Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263, 272 n.3 (1967) ("It was [sic] been held that the prior identification is hearsay, and,
when admitted through the testimony of the identifier, is merely a prior consistent statement.
The recent trend, however, is to admit the prior identification under the exception that admits as
substantive evidence a prior communication by a witness who is available for cross-examination
at trial.").
45. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 3 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801:11 (6th ed. 2006).
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time."46 The Report also explained that suggestion could "influence the
witness to change his mind" between the time of the earlier
identification and trial. 47 Finally, the Report noted a strategic concern
that "if any discrepancy occurs between the witness'[s] in-court and
out-of-court testimony, the opportunity is available to probe, with the
witness under oath, the reasons for that discrepancy so that the trier
of fact might determine which statement is to be believed."48 Unless
the prior identification is admissible, the defense attorney has no
means to explore how the eyewitness came to identify the defendant at
trial.
Perhaps because courtroom identification procedures are so
thinly regulated, very little scholarship has examined the special
problems that courtroom identifications raise or the way that these
problems undermine the jurisprudence of eyewitness identifications.
Evan Mandery has argued that courtroom identifications should be
per se excluded and certainly should not be treated more deferentially
than out-of-court identifications, and I agree. 49 As I will argue, the
problem runs deeper. We cannot understand due process rules
surrounding eyewitness identification procedures apart from the
problem of courtroom identifications. In a case that goes to trial, there
may be both prior lineups and a courtroom identification. There may
even be a courtroom identification at a preliminary hearing and
another at trial before the jury. (In the vast majority of cases that are
resolved by a guilty plea, there may sometimes be multiple
identification procedures conducted, but admissibility issues do not
arise.) As I will describe, over time, the Court's jurisprudence failed to
differentiate those multiple identifications, and lower courts have
since exacerbated the problem. Next, I try to untangle those rulings.
B. From Stovall to Manson
1. The Supreme Court Intervenes in Eyewitness Identification:
Stovall, Wade, and Gilbert
The Supreme Court has long recognized "[t]he vagaries of
eyewitness identification" where "the annals of criminal law are rife

46. S. REP. No. 94-199, at 2 (1975).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Mandery, supra note 39, at 389 ("[Wlhile the constitutional issues surrounding pretrial identifications have been widely litigated and explored by scholars, little attention has been

paid to the issues raised by in-court identifications.").
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with instances of mistaken identification." 50 The Court added that "a
major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of
justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion
inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect
to witnesses for pretrial identification." 51 In a trilogy of decisions
announced in 1967, the Court began to regulate eyewitness
identifications to help avert misidentifications. At the time, the
Court's intervention looked like the beginnings of a new approach
toward regulating the reliability of trial evidence. The Court adopted
the following two different approaches to the problem: a Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel approach and a due process approach. In
each of the two lines of cases the Court had to reckon with the
problems posed by courtroom identifications.
In Stovall v. Denno, the Court examined a showup procedure in
which the suspect was taken to the hospital where a victim was
recovering, was presented to the victim alone, and handcuffed to police
officers. 52 Though noting a showup is inherently suggestive, and for
that reason the procedure has been "widely condemned," the Court
acknowledged that showups may sometimes be necessary in exigent
circumstances. However, the Court then held that an "unnecessarily
suggestive" procedure that is "conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification" denies due process of law and results in exclusion of the
identification from the jury. This was new. Prior to Stovall, any police
use of suggestion was just evidence for the jury to weigh when
53
assessing the weight of the eyewitness identification.
In two other cases the Court also discussed police suggestion,
but it adopted a different approach to the problem, one that recognized
a right to counsel at a lineup procedure. In United States v. Wade, the
Court held that, once indicted, an accused has a right to a lawyer
present at a lineup. As a result, any lineup lacking counsel must be
excluded and not introduced into evidence at trial.54 However, the
prosecutors would have "the opportunity to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon
observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification." 55

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
Id.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 407 n.32 (7th Cir. 1975).
Wade, 388 U.S. at 235-36.
Id. at 240.
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The Court concluded that unless the in-court identification
might also be suppressed, a rule suppressing the out-of-court
identification would serve little purpose:
The State may then rest upon the witnesses' unequivocal courtroom identifications, and
not mention the pretrial identification as part of the State's case at trial. Counsel is then
in the predicament in which Wade's counsel found himself-realizing that possible
unfairness at the lineup may be the sole means of attack upon the unequivocal
courtroom identification, and having to probe in the dark in an attempt to discover and
courtroom identification
reveal unfairness, while bolstering the government witness'[s
56
by bringing out and dwelling upon his prior identification.

Thus, the Court recognized that the courtroom identification is
less reliable than prior identifications. Further, to the extent that the
prior identifications are suggestive or unreliable, the only way to bring
that out is to admit them. The Court, having identified the central
problem, did not suggest a clear solution, which would have been to
exclude the "unequivocal" courtroom identification while permitting
litigation of prior identifications. Instead, the Court held that a judge
must examine several factors to decide whether to allow the courtroom
identification, including the following: "the prior opportunity to
observe the alleged criminal act," any "discrepancy between any prelineup description and the defendant's actual description," any prior
lapse of
identifications or failures to identify the defendant, and "the
57
time between the alleged act and the lineup identification."
By examining those flexible factors, on remand the lower court
can decide whether the in-court identification had an "independent
origin.158 Of course, if a judge decides that, based on those factors, the
courtroom identification has an "independent origin," then an illegal
pretrial identification may be suppressed (although the defendant may
choose to introduce it at trial), but the judge may allow the courtroom
identification that would clearly be affected by what went on before.
How can a courtroom identification be independent? The Court noted
in Wade that "the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom
identification [that is] in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial
identification which the accused is helpless to subject to effective
scrutiny at trial."59 There are stronger arguments that an
identification could have an "independent origin" in court if the
pretrial identification was not suggestive. After all, the lineups in
Wade, by the Court's account, were conducted properly, with five to six

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 240-41.
at 241.
at 242.
at 235.
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fillers all dressed with strips of tape similar to that worn by the bank
robber. 60 The defect was the procedural failure to provide counsel.
In Gilbert v. California,the Court similarly dealt with whether
a courtroom identification could take place. 61 A series of suggestive
identifications took place postindictment and without counsel; over
one hundred witnesses viewed the same lineup at the same time in a
large auditorium and everyone discussed their identifications.6 2 The
Court remanded and ordered the state court to determine whether
such an identification, conducted without counsel in violation of Wade,
had an independent source. The Court explained, "The admission of
the in-court identifications without first determining that they were
not tainted by the illegal lineup but were of independent origin was
constitutional error."63 Thus, the Court established a rule that an
"independent" basis could result in the admission of the in-court
identifications, even, in theory, following suggestive prior lineups. The
64
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this ruling.
The Wade/Gilbert rule is of limited significance today. After
all, having the right to a lawyer present at a lineup is not a significant
protection. Other right-to-counsel protections are far more
consequential. Suspects who invoke their Miranda rights and obtain
an attorney can cut off an interrogation that might have otherwise
resulted in a confession. In contrast, having a lawyer present at a
lineup will not prevent the lineup from occurring. At best, it may
discourage police from making any obviously suggestive cues during
the lineup itself, though with the cost of potentially turning the lawyer
into a trial witness disqualified from further representation. 65 Nor
does the rule do any work in the vast majority of cases involving
eyewitnesses. That is because the Court has repeatedly weakened the
60. Id. at 220.
61. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 n.3 (1967) ("It was [sic] been held that the prior
identification is hearsay, and, when admitted through the testimony of the identifier, is merely a
prior consistent statement. The recent trend, however, is to admit the prior identification under
the exception that admits as substantive evidence a prior communication by a witness who is
available for cross-examination at trial.").
62. Id. at 270 & n.2.
63. Id. at 272. In contrast, the Court found a per se exclusionary rule as to the pretrial
identification based on the denial of counsel at the lineup. Id. at 273.
64, E.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 21
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Wade rule requires the
exclusion of any in-court identification preceded by a pretrial lineup where the accused was not
represented by counsel, unless the in-court identification is found to be derived from a source
'independent' of the tainted pretrial viewing.").
65. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering
UncorroboratedEyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1511 (2008)
(developing "the shortcomings of an attorney's presence as a remedy").
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rule-in part, by subsequently holding that there is no right to counsel
for a photo array. 66 The vast majority of identifications are not live but
67
are now chiefly conducted using photo arrays.
2. Manson and the Modern Two-Step Inquiry
In decisions immediately following the 1967 trilogy, the Court
indicated that an identification should be suppressed if the police
engage in egregious suggestion. In Foster v. California, the Court
ruled that, because a "tentative" witness only became sure after
repeated suggestive showups and lineups, all identifications should be
suppressed; "[iun effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This
is the man.' "68 For a short time, the Wade/Gilbert line of cases began
to converge with the Stovall line. In Simmons v. United States the
Court held that, when deciding whether to allow a courtroom
identification following a suggestive pretrial identification, the judge
should examine whether the earlier identification was "so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 69 As Justice Marshall later
explained,
The inquiry mandated by Simmons is similar to the independent-source test used in
Wade where an in-court identification is sought following an uncounseled lineup. In both
cases, the issue is whether the witness is identifying the defendant solely on the basis of
or whether he is merely remembering the
his memory of events at the time of the crime,
70
person he picked out in a pretrial procedure.

However, the cases then diverged as the Court took a different
tack in due process cases not raising Sixth Amendment right-tocounsel violations. The Court became concerned that a rule excluding
out-of-court identifications that resulted from unnecessary suggestion
would lead to the exclusion of reliable eyewitness evidence. The Court
proposed a new two-step inquiry in Neil v. Biggers,71 which was then
adopted in 1977 by the Court in Manson.72 That Manson test is the
current due process test that courts must follow.

66. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973).
67. Wells et al., supra note 31, at 608.
68. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1969).
69. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
70. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 122 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). The Court did not have occasion to rule on
whether that test should supplant the Stovall test in that case, since the lineup in question predated the Court's Stovall ruling. Id. at 200.
72. Manson, 432 U.S. at 113-14.
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First, following the Manson test, a court asks whether the
procedure used was "unnecessarily suggestive." 73 Then the court asks
whether the identification was nevertheless "reliable."74 A judge has
broad discretion to evaluate the record and decide whether there is
evidence that the identification is "reliable." 75 The Biggers factors
adopted by the Court in Manson include: (1) the eyewitness's
opportunity to view at the time of the crime itself; (2) the eyewitness's
degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the description that the
eyewitness gave of the criminal; (4) the eyewitness's level of certainty
at the time of the identification procedure; and (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification procedure.7 6
This due process test is somewhat different than the Wade test.
If there is a right-to-counsel violation at the lineup, under Wade, a
court asks whether the courtroom identification has an "independent
source" and examines factors relating to reliability. If instead there
was suggestion at the lineup, the court more directly looks at whether
the identification is reliable. The Manson "reliability" factors are
slightly different than the nonexclusive list in Wade. The main
addition that the Manson Court made to the Wade factors was the
fourth factor-the certainty of the eyewitness. Adding that factor was
a significant misstep, however, as psychologists would convincingly
show over the next three decades.
C. Social Science Research
The Manson Court emphasized that "reliability is the linchpin
in determining the admissibility of identification testimony." 77 In the
decades since the Court settled on its due process test, however, social
scientists have shown just how unhelpful and flawed each of the
Manson factors are for evaluating the reliability of an identification.
Their findings demonstrated just how susceptible eyewitness memory
is to cues or suggestions, intended or not, by the administrator of a
lineup.
Eyewitness identifications are designed to be a test of a
witness's memory. Pioneering psychologists Elizabeth Loftus and
Gary Wells, followed by many others, realized beginning in the late
1970s that eyewitness memory can be tested in lab experiments. A
73. Id. at 113.
74. Id.
75. See id. (directing judges to weigh the Biggers factors against the "corrupting effect of the
suggestive identification itself").
76. Id. at 114; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
77. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
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now vast body of social science research has demonstrated that most
of the five Manson "reliability" factors do not correlate at all with the
reliability of an eyewitness's identification. 78 One factor-the passage
of time from the crime to the identification-strongly affects
reliability; however, the effects are so pronounced in the immediate
hours and days following the crime that judges would have to exclude
a large number of identifications if they emphasized that factor. 79 In
contrast, the seemingly objective factor, the ability of a person to
describe another accurately, is not correlated one way or another with
reliability.8 0 The remaining factors are particularly crucial to the
analysis-and they are deeply flawed. The certainty of an eyewitness,
the opportunity of a witness to view the attacker, and the degree of
attention paid by the eyewitness are not independent measures of
reliability. Instead, the procedures police use affect the so-called
reliability factors.
A series of studies has shown that jurors rely strongly on the
confidence of the eyewitness. 8 1 Yet, confidence is not highly correlated
with accuracy. The correlation is highly variable. In fact, a mistaken
eyewitness may appear particularly confident. Why? A factor that
strongly affects confidence is suggestion by the administrator.
Expectations of the administrator affect the confidence of the
eyewitness even if the suggestion is unconscious. The eyewitness may
perceive cues that the police never intended to convey. That is why
social scientists have long recommended that police administer
double-blind lineups where the police officer does not know who is the

78. A white paper by the American Psychology-Law Society summarized the state of the
research and provides four recommendations for reforming eyewitness identification procedures.
Wells et al., supra note 31, at 603; see also Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 32 at 7-8 (explaining
lack of correlation between eyewitness description and accuracy of identification).
79. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 52-54 (1996); A. DANIEL YARMEY,
UNDERSTANDING POLICE WORK: PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES 298-300 (1990).

80. See Melissa Pigott & John C. Brigham, Relationship Between Accuracy of Prior
Description and Facial Recognition, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 547, 547-548 (1985) (finding
congruence and accuracy of eyewitness reports not highly related); Gary L. Wells, Verbal
Descriptions of Faces from Memory: Are They Diagnostic of Identification Accuracy?, 70 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 619, 623 (1985) (finding low relation between congruence and accuracy of
eyewitness reports).
81. E.g., Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Hedy Red Dexter, Juror Sensitivity to
Eyewitness IdentificationEvidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 190 (1990); Samuel R. Gross, Loss of
Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 400-01 (1987);
Richard S. Schmechel, Timothy P. O'Toole, Catharine Easterly & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Beyond
The Ken? Testing Jurors' Understandingof Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J.
177, 195-96 (2006); Wells et al., supra note 26, 619-621; Gary L. Wells, How Adequate is Human
Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testimony?, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984).
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suspect, and the eyewitness knows that the officer does not know.8 2
The way that police construct the lineup can enhance confidence. If
police stack the lineup so that one photo stands out, the eyewitness
not only will be more likely to identify the person highlighted, but the
eyewitness will predictably be more certain.8 3 Feedback or
reinforcement after the identification can also have a dramatic effect
on confidence. If police say, "Good job, you picked the right one," then
the eyewitness will tend to be far more certain. If police tell the
eyewitness that a suspect had been arrested and would be present in
the lineup, the eyewitness will likewise tend to be far more certain.8 4
Finally, studies suggest that repeated identification procedures create
an enhanced risk that a witness will identify an innocent suspect.8 5
Even permitting more than one "lap" or viewing of a photo array
increases the risk of errors.8 6 Likewise, routine preparation for trial,
or even the suggestion that an eyewitness will later be cross-examined
concerning an identification, has the effect of making an eyewitness
87
more certain.
The two prongs of the Manson test can undermine each other.
Suggestion does not just make an uncertain eyewitness feel more
confident, but it affects all of the other factors that the Supreme Court
included in the Manson test. Memory is malleable. Suggestion will

82. Wells et al., supra note 31, at 627-29.
83. LOFTuS ET AL., supra note 21, § 4-9. For an important field study documenting
advantages of a sequential procedure, showing lineup members to witnesses one at a time rather
than simultaneously, see WELLS, STEBLAY & DYSART, supra note 20.
84. See LoFTuS ET AL., supra note 21, § 4-8(b) (describing study by Roy Malpass and
Patricia Devine, and noting eighteen other studies demonstrating higher false identification
when such biased instructions were provided); Amy Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory
Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 864-65 (2006) (discussing how positive post-identification
feedback increases witness confidence in identification).
85. Nancy K. Steblay, MaintainingThe Reliability of Eyewitness Evidence: After the Lineup,
42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643, 647-51 (2009) (discussing data from studies of repeated lineups); see,
e.g., Gabriel W. Gorenstein & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Effect of Choosing an Incorrect Photographon
a Later Identification by an Eyewitness, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 616, 620-21 (1980) (studying
commitment effect of using a photo showup before a live lineup); Tiffany Hinz & Kathy Pezdek,
The Effect of Exposure to Multiple Lineups on Face Identification Accuracy, 25 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 185, 194-96 (2001) (assessing accuracy of identifications when intervening lineups
occur).

86. See, e.g., Nancy K. Steblay et al., Sequential Lineup Laps and Eyewitness Accuracy, 35
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 262, 271 (2011) (describing studies that find repeat viewings, or "laps,"
increase choosing rates and error rates, with particularly high error rates among witnesses who
choose to view a second time).
87. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 21, § 6-2; Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence
and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 817, 827
(1995).
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affect the details that an eyewitness remembers.8 8 The eyewitness
may recall having seen the culprit for a longer period of time and will
recall having had a better look at the culprit.8 9 The five Manson
factors poorly assess "reliability." They are circular, and highlight the
very features of eyewitness memory that may be most profoundly
affected by suggestion. Yet, a court may excuse serious police
suggestion by saying that an eyewitness identification is nonetheless
"reliable."
Still more problematic, in the situation where there are
multiple eyewitness identifications, a court may allow a courtroom
identification despite an earlier suggestive identification. The jury
then sees the now-confident eyewitness in court pointing at the
defendant. As Gary Wells puts it, "[E]yewitness identification evidence
is among the least reliable forms of evidence and yet is persuasive to
juries."90 One reason is that the jury does not see what occurred
before. The earlier lineups may not even have been documented. The
jury will instead hear the eyewitness describe what he saw.
In the typical situation in which the eyewitness is a victim, the
jury will hear the details of a stressful, if not frightening, encounter.
The eyewitness may then briefly recount the photo arrays or lineups,
but she may not remember the details of those procedures. The
eyewitness then will be asked how sure she is that the defendant is
the culprit. Finally, the eyewitness will point out the defendant in the
courtroom. The courtroom identification that the jurors see will be
more dramatic, and may be made with more confidence, than the
identifications that came before the trial. Further, the trial setting is
inherently suggestive, as well as public. While there have not been
field studies of courtroom identifications, there is every reason to
think that in a courtroom setting "conformity is at its peak" since
"pressure is high and.., judgments are made without anonymity." 9 1
Despite this now vast body of social science evidence, the Court
has not reconsidered its test; has denied certiorari petitions asking
that the test be revisited in light of social science research; and, as I
will develop, has not intervened when states adopted standards that
88. Gary L. Wells & D.M. Murray, What Can Psychology Say About the Neil vs. Biggers
Criteriafor Judging Eyewitness Identification Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 357-58
(1983).
89. Wells & Bradfield, supra note 8, at 374.
90. Wells et al., supra note 31, at 605.
91. Mandery, supra note 39, at 416; see also Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 32 ("Although
experiments have not directly tested the question of in-court identifications that occur after a
pretrial lineup, our understanding of transference and commitment effects leads to the
reasonable inference that a mistaken identification prior to trial is likely to be replicated during
an in-court identification.").
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carelessly apply if not distort the Manson test.92 Justice Sotomayor,
dissenting in Perry, argued that concerns with the adequacy of the due
process rule "should have deepened" based on a "vast body of scientific
literature" and concluded that "[i]t would be one thing if the passage
of time had cast doubt on the empirical premises of our precedents.
93
But just the opposite has happened."
Although we now know far more about the sources of
eyewitness unreliability, long before social scientists began
investigating eyewitness misidentification it was, as Samuel Gross put
it, "an old and famous problem." 94 Police are most familiar with the
problem because it significantly affects their investigations. In actual
police lineups, eyewitnesses choose known innocent fillers an average
of thirty percent of the time, according to available archival and field
studies. 95 Those common misidentifications are of less consequence
because it is obvious there is an error when a filler is picked. However,
they harm police investigations since an eyewitness who has selected
a filler may be "burned," or viewed by jurors with more suspicion
should that eyewitness later identify a true suspect. If an eyewitness
picks an innocent suspect and not a filler, the consequences may be
more serious. DNA exonerations have raised the profile of eyewitness
errors in cases that went further, resulting in convictions overturned
only years later through DNA testing.
In Convicting the Innocent, I examine the trial transcripts of
the first 250 DNA exonerees. 96 Eyewitnesses misidentified seventy-six
percent of the exonerees (190 of 250 cases). 97 I expected to see a large
body of eyewitness misidentifications in these cases. After all, DNA
testing is most readily used to exonerate individuals convicted of rape,
and such cases often involve a victim eyewitness. However, when I
began studying those unusual trials, I feared that I would not be able
to say very much about the eyewitness misidentifications. After all, we

92. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3-4, Perez v. United States, 547 U.S. 1002
(2006) (No. 05-596), 2005 WL 3038542 (certiorari petition seeking review of Biggers and Manson
test based on new empirical studies); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 304-06 (Conn. 2005)
(Connecticut Supreme Court rejecting constitutional challenge, citing "scientific studies" to the
five factor test of Biggers and Manson).
93. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 738 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
94. Gross, supra note 81, at 395.
95. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728 (citing Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus
Curiae as "describing research indicating that as many as one in three eyewitness identifications
is inaccurate"); Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 32, at 6; see also HENDERSON REPORT, supranote
6, at 15-16 (providing an overview of error rates found in archival studies, together with results
from field studies and laboratory experiments).
96. GARRETT, supranote 7, at 7.
97. Id. at 9.
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do not often have records of what transpired during the identification
procedures; police usually do not document them. Yet, the trial records
alone told a troubling story. In the vast majority of those cases,
seemingly powerful eyewitness testimony was flawed.
One high-profile case provides an example of how the lack of
regulation of in-court identifications affects the use of eyewitness
identification procedures. 98 Neil Miller was facing charges of
aggravated rape in Massachusetts in 1990. Someone raped and robbed
the victim in her apartment. Miller's defense was one of mistaken
identification. He maintained that he had never met the victim nor
been to her apartment. 99
Neil Miller's defense attorney was concerned that photo arrays
had been conducted in a suggestive manner. About a month after the
attack, the detective brought an array of nine photos for the victim to
view. From that array, she selected two photos, but was not sure if she
could pick out either individual as the attacker.1 0 0 One of the two was
a six-year-old photo of Neil Miller taken when he was only sixteen.
The second was of another man. The detective recalled instructing
her, "[I]f she had a first impression, that the best thing to do was go
with her first impression."'' 1 The victim then identified Neil Miller's
photo, and Miller was arrested. 10 2 A second array was conducted two
months later, with a more recent photo of Miller, and the victim
picked his photo. 103 Neil Miller's defense lawyer then made a motion to
request a new photo array at the upcoming pretrial hearing.104
However, just before the hearing was to take place, the
prosecutor and a detective walked the victim past Neil Miller in the
hallway outside the courtroom. 105 Even after having being told that
her attacker might be in that hallway, when she saw him there, she
was not sure. She followed Miller into the courtroom (where it was
obvious who he was), looked at him again, and said, "This is him."'10 6
Now the hearing to request a new lineup was in effect moot. Even if
the judge ordered that a new photo array be conducted, due to both of
98. See Neil Miller, FRONTLINE, THE BURDEN OF INNOCENCE, PROFILES (May 1, 2003),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/frontline/showsfburden/profiles/miller.html.
99. Trial Transcript at 3-14, Commonwealth v. Miller, No. 085602-04 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Dec.
18, 1990) [hereinafter Miller Trial Transcript].
100. Id. at 37-38, 68-69 (Dec. 17, 1990).
101. Id. at 72.
102. Id. at 41.
103. Id. at 42-43, 53.
104. Brief and Record Appendix for the Defendant on Appeal at 7 n.7, Commonwealth v.
Miller, 609 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 1992) (No. 92-P-612).
105. Id. at 6-7; Miller Trial Transcript, supra note 99, at 126 (Dec. 17, 1990).
106. Miller Trial Transcript, supra note 99, at 123-34 (Dec. 17, 1990).
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the prior suggestive procedures, the victim would likely again pick out
Miller and then testify with confidence before the jury. The judge
granted the defendant's motion to suppress the identification the
morning of the hearing and ruled that the jury could not hear about it.
However, the judge was still willing to let the jury hear about the first
identification from the photo array where the police officer made the
suggestions; of course the defense would want to bring out that
conduct. Further, the judge let the jury observe the victim on the
stand identifying Miller.1 07 The judge ruled that the courtroom
identification had an "independent basis" based on the witness's
original view of the perpetrator.1 0 Even though the victim was
initially not sure that Miller was the right man, the jury saw the
victim identify him in court and say she was "positive" he was the
attacker.109
There was no other evidence at trial, aside from some very
limited forensics. 110 The jury convicted Miller and sentenced him to
twenty-six to forty-five years in prison. 1 Neil Miller was an innocent
man. He was exonerated by postconviction DNA testing in 2000 after
serving almost ten years in prison. Moreover, the DNA tests matched
another man. 11 2 The testimony in Miller's case and in the other 249
cases illustrates how police suggestion can increase the confidence of
eyewitnesses, even if they are wrong. Courts readily admitted those
identifications, despite sometimes glaring evidence of suggestion or
unreliability.
All but a handful of the eyewitnesses who we now know
misidentified innocent people were certain at the time of trial. For
example, an eyewitness in Steven Avery's case testified, "[T]here is
absolutely no question in my mind."11 3 In Thomas Doswell's case, the
victim testified, "This is the man or it is his twin brother" and "That is
one face I will never forget ..
,"114 In Dean Cage's case, the victim

107. Id. at 104-05.
108. Id. at 128-29; see also Brief and Record Appendix, supranote 104, at 23-24.
109. Miller Trial Transcript, supranote 99, at 105 (Dec. 17, 1990).
110. The crime lab analyst (incorrectly) described the forensics as including Neil Miller but
also forty-five percent of the population (in fact, no man could be excluded). See Brandon L.
Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95
VA. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2009) (explaining invalid testimony concerning the phenomenon of
"masking" and non-quantification in that case and others).
111. Neil Miller, supra note 98.
112. Id.
113. Trial Transcript at 304, State v. Avery, No. 85 FE 118 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1985).
114. Trial Transcript at 11, 62, Commonwealth v. Doswell, No. CC 8603467 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1.
Nov. 19, 1986).
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was "a hundred percent sure." 115 In Willie Otis "Pete" Williams's case,
the victim said she was "one hundred and twenty" percent sure. 116
What explains the false confidence of those eyewitnesses? In seventyeight percent of those trials (125 of the 161 cases involving
eyewitnesses in which trial records could be located), there was
evidence that police contaminated the identifications. Many of those
eyewitnesses were asked to pick out the suspect using suggestive
methods long known to increase risks of error. Police made remarks
that indicated who should be selected, used unnecessary showups, or
used lineups that made the defendant stand out. Suggestion is related
to the second problem, that of false certainty. In fifty-seven percent of
the trials studied (92 of 161 cases), witnesses reported they had not
been certain at the earlier identifications, or identified other people.
These high-profile wrongful convictions have made more
salient what criminal practitioners, judges, and social scientists have
known for years-eyewitness memory is malleable and can be strongly
affected by police suggestion. The Supreme Court's due process cases
acknowledge a problem but offer no solution.
Nor is the Court likely to reform its due process test. If
anything, the majority in Perry v. New Hampshire expressed a view
that the application of that due process test should be narrowed to
avoid regulating all eyewitness identifications, despite the "fallibility"
of eyewitness evidence.11 7 The Court in making that point even noted
the problem of courtroom identifications, stating: "Most eyewitness
identifications involve some element of suggestion. Indeed, all in-court
identifications do."118 Of course, the suggestion inherent in such
procedures should cause the Justices to consider whether jurors are in an
adequate position to assess the reliability of that evidence. The Court's
mention of courtroom identifications and unwillingness to question their
use is symptomatic of a larger problem. Justice Sotomayor in dissent
highlighted how: "At trial, an eyewitness'[s] artificially inflated
confidence in an identification's accuracy complicates the jury's task of
assessing witness credibility and reliability. It also impairs the
defendant's ability to attack the eyewitness'[s] credibility."'1 9 Still
more problematic, as I discuss next, state and federal courts interpret
the Court's rulings to provide nearly unfettered use of the most
problematic courtroom identifications.
115. Trial Transcript at J-128, People v. Cage, 94 29467 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. January 9, 1995).
116. See Bill Rankin, Exonerations Urge Changes for Eyewitnesses, ATLANTA J-CONST., Dec.
25, 2008, at C1 (quoting from victim's testimony).
117. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012).
118. Id. at 727.
119. Id. at 732 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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II. THE PERSISTENCE OF "INDEPENDENT SOURCE" RULES

Social scientists that carefully studied flaws in the Supreme
Court's due process test for admissibility of eyewitness identifications
may have taken the letter of the law too seriously. They have studied
each of the factors in the Manson test and have critiqued their
reliability with the assumption that courts actually follow the test as
promulgated by the Court. One cannot blame anyone for assuming
that lower courts would follow the precise language of a Supreme
Court ruling. However, in practice, courts do not, and to a surprising
degree. Not only is the Manson test flawed because of its focus on
"reliability" factors that are not independent of police suggestion, but
in practice the test is often not carefully applied, particularly to
courtroom identifications. Commentators have observed that, in
general, judges apply the Manson test very deferentially if not
carelessly. 120 After all, the factors are quite flexible, and they excuse
even extreme and unnecessary police suggestion based on flimsy
evidence of "reliability" under a totality of the circumstances test.
Appellate judges defer to trial judge discretion in applying those five
broad factors. There is still another defect in the case law. A crucial
but largely unnoticed loophole can short-circuit the Manson inquiry in
the most pressing situation where the identification procedure
conducted before trial was suggestive-independent source rules.
A. "IndependentSource" Rules
Even after a suggestive pretrial identification procedure, courts
still permit a courtroom identification by citing to its "independent"
source or "independent" reliability. That courtroom identification may
be pretrial, in which case it may shape what the eyewitness says at
trial. Or, that courtroom identification may occur at trial. As noted,
courts hold that the Due Process Clause does not forbid courtroom
identifications, despite their inherent suggestiveness. 121 They cite to

120. See O'Toole & Shay, supra note 1, at 129 ('The Manson rule of decision also produces
rote and unconvincing analysis in state court opinions.").
121. See; State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 189, 193 (Conn. 1986) ('The manner in which in-court
identifications are conducted is not of constitutional magnitude but rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court"); Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 132 (D.C. 1979) (noting
that in-court identifications are 'less threatening of the due process guarantee" than one-on-one
confrontations in the police station); Ralston v. State, 309 S.E.2d 135, 136 (Ga. 1983) (reasoning
that in-court identifications are not scrutinized for reliability because they are under the
supervision of the court); State v. Clausell, 580 A.2d 221, 235 (N.J. 1990) (holding that an incourt identification was "constitutionally valid" despite the fact that the witness had not been
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the "supervision" provided by the trial judge to ensure an "impartial"
identification in court. 122 Nor do courts typically require special
procedures to test eyewitness memory in the courtroom. Still more
troubling, courts adopt a permissive approach to allowing courtroom
identifications despite prior suggestive or illegal identifications.
The vast majority of state courts, when applying the Due
Process Clause, rule that an identification, and particularly a
courtroom identification, may be allowed even where a prior
identification might be suppressed, citing to its "independent
source." 123 This is not casual language adopted by outlier jurisdictions.
Rather, this language is adopted by courts of thirty-eight states and
the District of Columbia, with six more states adopting similar
language and three states with mixed rulings. Nor do state courts
appear to revisit their leading rulings on the problem of eyewitness
identifications frequently, perhaps because the U.S. Supreme Court
has not revisited the problem either.
To be sure, most of those written decisions on appeal did not
confront the situation where the prior identification was in fact
suppressed, but the courtroom identification was permitted. 124 It is
very rare for a court to suppress identifications, because the Manson
test is already so deferential. However, not only did several states
explicitly allow the courtroom identification while excluding the prior
identifications, but the others describe how they need not examine
whether the prior identifications are suggestive. They assume, for the
sake of argument, that the prior identifications could be excluded but
emphasize how the courtroom identification would be allowed. After
able to identify the defendant previously in a photo array). Mandery, supra note 39, provides an
excellent discussion of these cases at 402-03.
122. Ralston, 309 S.E.2d at 136; People v. Rodriguez, 480 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985).
123. Such language has been adopted by courts in thirty-eight states and Washington D.C.:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. The Appendix contains one or more citations to leading
cases from each of those states.
124. Rulings in Massachusetts, South Carolina and Wisconsin all provide examples. See
Commonwealth v. Delrio, 2003 WL 21028648, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003) ("Notwithstanding
the suppression of the identification following the showup, the witness should be permitted to
make an in court identification based on the doctrine of independent source."); State v. Carlson,
611 S.E.2d 283, 290 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) ('The in-court identification is admissible if based on
information independent of the out-of-court procedure."); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 596
(Wis. 2005) ('The witness would still be permitted to identify the defendant in court if that
identification is based on an independent source." (quoting People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384
(N.Y. 1981))).
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all, the "independent source" language is designed to permit a
separate inquiry for a courtroom identification that would give trial
courts considerable leeway to find an "independent source" for the
courtroom
identification,
regardless
of whether
the prior
identifications were suggestive and might be excluded.
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asked "whether there
exists a basis for identification which is independent of the allegedly
suggestive showup." 12 5 How could there be such a basis? The same
eyewitness is testifying at trial with a memory affected by the showup.
Similarly, a South Carolina appellate court noted that "[t]he in-court
identification is admissible if based on information independent of the
out-of-court procedure." 126 What "information" does that eyewitness
have that is "independent" where nothing has transpired except that
the eyewitness is now confronted with the same person in a courtroom
setting? The Virginia Supreme Court found "that the in-court
identifications had independent sources free from taint" but made
explicit that the supposedly "independent" information was just "the
ample opportunities the victims availed themselves of' to observe the
attacker.127 The North Carolina Supreme Court explained that it need
not inquire whether pretrial suggestion tainted in-court identifications
because "the trial judge concluded that the witnesses' in-court
identifications of defendant were of 'independent origin, based solely
upon what the witnesses saw at the time of the crime.' "128 Also
remarkable, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the trial court need
not inquire into a suggestive identification at a preliminary hearing
because the courtroom identification at trial had an "independent
source" from the earlier in-court identification. 129 In one final example,
the Supreme Court of Kansas stated, "A reliable in-court identification
will stand on its own regardless of whether it was preceded by a
deficient pretrial identification." 130 How can it stand on its own when
that same eyewitness was subjected to suggestive pretrial procedures?
The list of such holdings goes on and on, as the Appendix
details, providing examples of leading and typical rulings from each

125. Commonwealth v. Rollins, 738 A.2d 435, 443 (Pa. 1999).
126. State v. Carlson, 611 S.E.2d 283, 290 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Rogers 210
S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 1974)).
127. McCary v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 645 (Va. 1984).
128. State v. Freeman, 330 S.E.2d 465, 471 (N.C. 1985).
129. Gipson v. State, 575 P.2d 782, 787 (Alaska 1978) ("The foregoing evidence of
identification, which we consider overwhelming, had an 'independent source' from the tainted incourt identification which occurred at the first preliminary hearing.").
130. State v. Trammel, 92 P.3d 1101, 1110 (Kan. 2004) (citing State v. Edwards, 955 P.2d
1276 (Kan. 1998)).
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state. In addition to the thirty-eight states adopting independent
source rules, six more states and some federal courts discuss
"independent reliability" of an identification (but federal courts
otherwise follow the proper due process test and do not cite to
"independent source" outside of the Sixth Amendment context). 131 In
doing so, those courts follow Manson but use the word "independent"
to refer to the "reliability" factors or to highlight how a courtroom
identification may be considered reliable despite what came before.132
Only five states adopt no language suggesting a different standard for
courtroom identifications.133 At least one more state adopts the correct
131. Those six states are Delaware, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont.
See State v. Johnson, No. K91-06-0069I, 1991 WL 302644, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 1991)
("A court may admit evidence based on an otherwise 'unnecessarily suggestive' identification
procedure if counsel can show the independent reliability of the identification testimony.");
Grady v. Commonwealth, 325 S.W.3d 333, 354 (Ky. 2010) ("[T]he unduly suggestive nature of the
pre-trial lineup becomes totally irrelevant if a court determines that there is an independent
basis of reliability for the in-court identification."); Berry v. State, 834 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1992) ("A courtroom identification will not be invalidated if it can be established that
it was independently reliable under the totality of the circumstances." (citing Cole v. State, 766
P.2d 538, 359 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988))); State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 410 (R.I. 2008) ("If the
procedure is found to have been unnecessarily suggestive, the second step requires a
determination of whether the identification still has independent reliability despite the
suggestive nature of the identification procedure." (citing State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 293
(R.I. 1990))); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989) ("[I]f the photo array is
impermissibly suggestive, then the in-court identification must be based on an untainted,
independent foundation to be reliable."); State v. Savo, 446 A.2d 786, 791 (Vt. 1982) ("An in-court
identification, even where it has been preceded by a suggestive pretrial identification, may still
be admissible where its reliability can be independently established.").
132. See, e.g., Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Manson v.
Brathwaite and discussing the need to weigh factors suggesting independent reliability); see also
United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (in-court identification admissible though
police showed witness photo of defendant with words "Harrisburg Police Department" printed
above his head because witness had previously lived with defendant and thus in-court
identification was independently reliable); United States v. McCabe, No. 89-30271, 1990 WL
61969902, at *1 (9th Cir. May 14, 1990) ("Because the procedure used in this case was not
impermissibly suggestive, [the defendant's] due process claim fails, and inquiry into the
independent reliability factors set forth in Manson v. Brathwaite is not required." (citation
omitted)).
133. I have found no due process cases providing "independent source" or "independent
reliability" language in five states: Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, Tennessee, or Wyoming.
See, e.g., State v. Atkins, No. 03C01-9302-CR-00058, 1994 WL 81524, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Mar. 3, 1994) ("If a court determines that under the Biggers standard a pretrial confrontation
was so impermissibly suggestive that it violated an accused's due process rights, the independent
origin of the in-court identification is irrelevant. Both out-of-court and in-court identifications are
automatically excluded."). One Montana decision is ambiguous on this point. State v. Hedrick,
745 P.2d 355, 358 (Mont. 1987) ("The independent basis for the victim's in court identification
also prevents the possibility of a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."). North
Dakota had one case citing to an independent basis for admitting an in-court identification, but
the case predated Manson, and, absent any more recent rulings, North Dakota was not included.
State v. McKay, 234 N.W.2d 853, 858 (N.D. 1975) ("[Imn-court identification of the defendant was
not based on a suggestive viewing of him at the police station, but had a basis independent of
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language in some decisions but adopts "independent source" language
in others. 134 Very few judges recognize that the Manson/Biggers test
135
has superseded such inquiries into "independent source."
Most of these courts, if they provide an explanation of what it
means to ask whether a suggestive identification has an "independent
source" or "independent reliability," follow a "totality of the
circumstances" inquiry. They may then follow the correct Manson test
in form, but only by ignoring the effect of the prior identifications on
the courtroom identification. 1 36 To be sure, these judges are not
applying a standard that is formally more demanding than the
Manson test (despite language that the prosecution has the burden to
show an independent source by "clear and convincing evidence"). 137 On
that viewing."). A more recent ruling failed to reach the issue. State v. Lewis, 302 N.W.2d 396,
399 (N.D. 1981).
134. See Webster v. State, 474 A.2d 1305, 1316 (Md. 1984) ("['The trial court] looked to the
'independent source' rule of Wade-Gilbert, but, as we have pointed out supra, that rule is
concerned only with a lineup which is illegal on Sixth Amendment right to counsel grounds. It is
not the test for the admissibility of identification evidence challenged on Fourteenth Amendment
due process grounds."). But see Barrow v. State, 474 A.2d 967, 976 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
("Even if the State fails to satisfy the legality of a pre-trial confrontation or viewing, the State
may still secure the admissibility of a courtroom identification by the same identifying witness if
it establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a courtroom identification had a source
independent of the prior illegal confrontation or viewing."); Alston v. State, 934 A.2d 949, 967
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (asking "whether the courtroom identification has an independent
source").
135. Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1549 (8th Cir. 1984) (McMillian, J., dissenting)
("[C]oncepts of 'purged taint' and 'independent origin' have been blended into, and superseded by,
the two-step process of weighing reliability against suggestiveness articulated in Biggers.");
United States v. Batista Ferrer, 842 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.P.R. 1994); State v. McMorris, 570
N.W.2d 384, 393 (Wis. 1997) ("[Tlhe Wade and Biggers tests are derived from different
constitutional amendments and are intended to achieve different purposes."); see also Bernal v.
People, 44 P.3d 184, 204-05 (Colo. 2002) (Coats, J., dissenting) ("By analogy to a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, many jurisdictions, including this one, considered the
witness's independent ability to make an identification only as an 'independent source' or
'independent basis' for allowing an in-court identification, despite an 'unduly,' 'impermissibly,'
'unnecessarily,' or 'unconstitutionally' suggestive out-of-court procedure."). The judge added:
"Unlike violations of the Fourth or Sixth Amendment, from which the 'independent source'
doctrine is clearly borrowed, however, the due process test applies to both the "derivative" incourt identification and the challenged pretrial identification itself .. " Id. at 206.
136. See, e.g., People v. Gray, 577 N.W.2d 92, 96 n.8 (Mich. 1998) ('The remedy for a
violation of the right to counsel is the same as the remedy for an unduly suggestive identification
procedure: suppression of the in-court identification unless there is an independent basis for its
admission.").
137. Doing so might in theory create an elevated standard, where a prosecutor could only
overcome a per se exclusion of the evidence could by a showing of clear and convincing evidence
that the identification had an "independent source" and was reliable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Botelho, 343 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Mass. 1976) ("[The prosecution is limited to introducing at trial
only such identifications by the witness as are shown at the suppression hearing not to be the
product of the suggestive confrontation-the later identifications, to be usable, must have an
independent source."); State v. Iron Necklace, 430 N.W.2d 66, 84 (S.D. 1988) ("[Tlhe proof shifts
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appeal or postconviction, judges defer to the trial court's exercise of
discretion and accept trial court factual findings. As a result, appellate
or postconviction judges do not typically explain their analysis with
much detail or rigor. They may simply note, after citing to an
"independent source," that the identifications appear reliable under
the circumstances, again without considering the impact of prior
identifications on the courtroom identification.
Courts do not actually insist on some independent source in the
sense of a truly independent event that created a more reliable
identification. Situations like that can occur. For example, the fact
that an eyewitness had already been well acquainted with the suspect
could be evidence of greater reliability that is truly "independent" of
any suggestion at the police lineup. Some courts do treat
identifications by acquaintances differently, although the question of
how much familiarity should suffice to assure greater reliability poses
complex practical and theoretical problems. 138 In a different sense, an
to the State to then prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification had
an independent origin."); Powell v. State, 271 N.W.2d 610, 617 (Wis. 1978) ("In cases which
involve the validity of subsequent in-court identifications the rule is clear: once the defendant
shows that the out-of-court identification was improper, the state has the burden of showing that
the subsequent in-court identification derived from an independent source and was thus free of
taint."). However, in practice courts conduct the same "totality of the circumstances" inquiry, but
without considering the prior identifications as a critical part of the relevant circumstances.
138. Complex questions can be raised by assertions that the eyewitness was previously
familiar with the suspect. While I do not address the subject here, I note that there are, for
instance, underlying questions whether and when familiarity leads to greater reliability-or
perhaps reduced reliability under some circumstances. See Lisa J. Steele, Who Was That Masked
Man?, 48 CRIM. L. BULL., Winter 2012 (reviewing social science literature and noting that
"[f]amiliarity affects eyewitness testimony in 'nuanced, complex, and often counterintuitive
ways.' " (citation omitted)). There are questions of proof as to how familiar an eyewitness really
was. In addition, courts adopt a range of approaches. Some courts merely note a spectrum of
familiarity; some demand strong evidence of familiarity, while others appear to find familiarity
present even based on very brief prior encounters. See People v. Sheppard, No. 241766, 2003 WL
22717987, at *3 (Mich. App. Nov. 8, 2003) (noting that to determine whether there is an
independent basis for identification, one can look to, inter alia, "the witness's prior knowledge of
the defendant."); People v. Yara, No. 9479/00, 2002 WL 31627019, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 6,
2002) ("[T]he courts have carved out a 'confirmatory identification exception.' The rationale for
this exception is premised on the principle that due to the familiarity between the witness and
the suspect, there is little or no risk that police suggestion can lead to mis-identification ....
The
exception may confidently be applied where the protagonists are family members, friends, or
acquaintances; at the other extreme, it clearly does not apply when the familiarity emanates
from a brief encounter."); see also State v. Marquez, 967 A.2d 56, 82 (Conn. 2009) (finding
"independent source" where eyewitness saw defendant at parole office prior to lineup); Dang v.
United States, 741 A.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. 1999) (finding enough evidence for independent basis
from the witness's close contact with the robbers in adequate lighting for an extended period of
time); Butler v. State, 382 S.E.2d 616, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) ("In the instant case there was
lengthy testimony as to the independent origin of the victim's identification of Butler; he had
visited her apartment in the past, she knew him from his place of employment, she recognized
his voice, and [she] got a glimpse of his face when it was lighted by the street light."); State v.
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identification that is not the product of police suggestion, but of the
eyewitness's own actions, like viewing a photo of the defendant in a
newspaper or a yearbook, might be seen as "independent" of police
efforts to test the eyewitness's memory, although such identifications
139
might nevertheless be unreliable.
While these decisions occur in the context of deferential
appellate and postconviction review, what is troubling about the
decisions is the notion, implicitly rejected by Manson, that there is
something "independent" about a courtroom identification. They do
not say that evidence of reliability overcomes or excuses suggestion
but that they have independent access to the reliability of the witness.
Courts speak of the witnesses' "independent recollection" of the
culprit's appearance. Indeed, the problem extends beyond the question
of admissibility. Trial judges even instruct jurors on such a standard
in some states, when explaining what weight they should give to a
40
courtroom identification. 1

Tann, 273 S.E.2d 720, 726 (N.C. 1981) (holding that the "one-man show-up" and the victim's
identification before the defendant was produced by the officers was ample evidence of
independent origin); State v. Jaeb, 442 N.W.2d 463, 465 (S.D. 1989) (upholding the lower court's
holding that seeing the assailant on several occasions in good light and identifying her in a fair
lineup was enough evidence of independent source).
139. See, e.g., United States v. DeJesus, 912 F. Supp. 129, 139 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that a
newspaper photograph which jogged the victim's image was not unduly suggestive); Utley v.
State, 589 N.E.2d 232, 237-38 (Ind.1992) (upholding the trial court's finding that a photographic
array with the defendant appearing twice was not unduly suggestive); People v. Whitaker, 126
A.D.2d 688, 688-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1987) (noting that identifying the assailant in a
yearbook photograph was not tainted by police procedures). But see State v. Atwood, 832 P.2d
593, 603 (Ariz. 1992) (upholding the trial courts determination that only two of fourteen
witnesses' pretrial viewings of press coverage were unduly suggestive); People v. Prast, 319
N.W.2d 627, 634-35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) ('"Where an identification of a defendant is based upon
a newspaper photograph rather than the witness's own perceptions, it should be excluded.");
Rogers v. State, 774 S.W.2d 247, 259-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ("Since the police procedure was
not itself suggestive, the fact that several eyewitnesses were exposed to a media photo of
appellant one day before attending a police lineup might, at most, be taken to affect the weight,
although not the admissibility, of their trial testimony."), overruled by Peek v. State, 106 S.W. 3d
72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Lynn M. Talutis, Annotation, Admissibility of In-Court
Identification as Affected by Pretrial Encounter that was not Result of Action by Police,
Prosecutors,and the Like, 86 A.L.R. 5th 463, Part TI.B. (2001) (citing cases that allowed media
identifications as admissible evidence, but also citing others that claimed the evidence was
inadmissible).
140. See State v. Cannon, 713 P.2d 273, 281 (Ariz. 1985) (approving jury instruction stating,
"[y]ou are instructed that you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the in-Court
identification was independant [sic] of the previous pre-trial identification or, if not derived from
an independent source, you must find from other evidence in the case that the defendant is the
guilty person beyond a reasonable doubt").
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B. Crossing Two Lines of Eyewitness Decisions

This independent source concept arises from a confusion of the
two lines of Supreme Court eyewitness identification cases that
developed in the late 1960s through the 1970s. Courts may simply be
befuddled by the tangled case law leading up to the Manson decision,
in which different standards applied for admitting an in-court versus
an out-of-court identification. Some of those courts, as noted, hearken
back to the Wade/Gilbert line of cases and still cite to the
"independent source" doctrine, in which even if a judge concludes that
an identification was illegal, the judge may allow an in-court
identification. That doctrine now ostensibly only applies to Sixth
Amendment violations of the right to counsel at postindictment
lineups. Recall that Simmons began to make such a distinction in the
due process and police suggestion context, but the Court undid that
distinction in Manson by ruling that the standard for any
identification is whether it is "reliable" despite any police suggestion.
The independent source concept used in Wade and Gilbert
came from an unlikely and inapposite source-exclusionary rule
doctrine. In the search and seizure context, an illegal arrest may lead
to a search that uncovers valuable evidence. Courts may exclude all of
the evidence as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 141 However, there are
three exceptions to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" implication of the
exclusionary rule: inevitable discovery, attenuation doctrine (neither
is analogous in any way), and independent source doctrine. 142 The
independent source doctrine is less problematic when the source was
known to police before the illegality, though "[t]he problem, of course,
is that there is no way to get the cat back into the bag."'143 In the
typical case, though, an illegal arrest leads to a search that uncovers
evidence of guilt. Such cases go to the heart of concern with the
exclusionary rule. Police uncover reliable evidence of guilt but through
illegal means.
In other contexts, the Court has held that a person's own
independent actions may create a source independent of law
enforcement illegality. For example, a confession is not something
with an independent source when the suspect is questioned
immediately following an illegal search. Passage of time, the Court
has ruled, can "dissipate the taint" of the illegal search, or even of an
141. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
142. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984) (adopting inevitable discovery theory);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-10 (1975) (discussing attenuation theory).
143. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.3(d),

at 528-29 (5th ed. 2009).
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initial coercive interrogation. 144 Similarly, if an eyewitness identifies a
defendant in a lineup after an illegal arrest, a court might have good
reasons to allow that eyewitness to identify the defendant at trial. The
victim's identification was not tainted by the illegal arrest, since the
defendant is "not himself a suppressible 'fruit.' "145
Perhaps because police suggestion is not an independent act, in
Manson the Court abandoned the fiction of an "independent source"
for a courtroom identification even where the out-of-court
identification would be suppressed. The Wade/Gilbert line of cases is
different. After all, in the Sixth Amendment context, even if the
identification in court cannot be truly said to be "independent," at
least the violation of the right to counsel likely did not affect the
reliability of the identification. The inquiry into whether the
identification was reliable is distinct. Further, the same policy concern
is present as in exclusionary rule cases generally. A procedural
violation, the failure to provide counsel at a postindictment lineup,
may result in the exclusion of reliable evidence of guilt. The purpose of
the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct, but as in the
Fourth Amendment context, the Court in the Sixth Amendment
context created exceptions to allow reliable cases to go forward.146
In contrast, in the due process context, the illegal means are
precisely what makes the evidence unreliable. In the eyewitness
context, neither time nor unrelated events can "dissipate the taint." In
addition, the Court does not adopt the same approach toward
deterring police misconduct in the eyewitness context, noting that
police may not need a strong deterrent since "[t]he interest in
obtaining convictions of the guilty also urges the police to adopt
147
procedures that show the resulting identification to be accurate."
The very idea that a courtroom identification could be seen as
"independent" is anomalous. But that has not stopped nearly all
courts in the country from seizing on language from the Court
admittedly confusing early due process case law to justify departing
from Manson and encouraging the admission of courtroom
identifications despite earlier suggestion.

144. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963).
145. United States v. Crews, 455 U.S. 463, 474 (1980).
146. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("[Tjhe rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect..
. . As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.").
147. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 & n.12 (1977) ("Although the per se approach
has the more significant deterrent effect, the totality approach also has an influence on police
behavior.").
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Indeed, as noted, some courts outright conflate the lines of
cases and cite to Wade when they apply the "independent source" rule
in cases claiming due process (not Sixth Amendment) violations. 148
The one piece of commentary mentioning this flaw in the "independent
source" case law, a Texas criminal practice guide, noted such "analysis
is properly used only when the pretrial procedure is tainted by a
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."1 49 In practice, it
appears that courts ask whether under the "totality of the
circumstances" an identification appears reliable. While the test may
be "technically, but not practically" different from the Manson v.
Brathwaite analysis, 15 0 the important difference is that there is no
meaningful assessment of the reduced reliability of the courtroom or
other subsequent identifications. Instead, courts look back to the
original view the eyewitness had as an "independent source."
C. What Is Independent About the Source?
What is the independent source that courts are referring to?
Courts treat an eyewitness almost like an object that can simply be
shown to the jury. They discuss eyewitness memory as if it were a
fixed image, like a photo or a video. However, as social scientists have
demonstrated over many hundreds of studies, eyewitness memory is
highly malleable and is nothing like a photo or a video. An
eyewitness's memory must be carefully preserved or it can become
contaminated. Each effort to test an eyewitness's memory will reshape
that memory.1 51 In the courtroom, the eyewitness cannot access a
memory of what happened that is "independent" of the suggestive
lineups that came before. While courts discuss the "independent
recollection" of the eyewitness at trial, there is nothing independent
about that recollection at trial. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized
as much early on. In Simmons, the Court noted that "the witness
thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph

148. Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1188 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The tests of'independent origin'
set forth in Wade appear to be functionally identical to the reliability tests articulated in Neil v.
Biggers ....

").

149. See DIX & DAWSON, supra note 22, § 14.39 ("[Tlhe Texas courts have almost certainly
erred in uncritically assuming that in-court identification testimony offered despite an earlier
identification made at an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is sometimes admissible under the
independent source analysis."). They add, "Since the situation must present a very substantial
risk of misidentification as a result of the unnecessarily suggestive procedure, surely it cannot be
said that the in-court identification can have a source independent of that procedure." Id.
150. LOFTUS ETAL., supranote 21, §8-18, at 194 n.107.
151. See infra Part I.C.
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rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness
' 152
of subsequent lineup or courtroom identification."
As Elizabeth Loftus, James Doyle, and Jennifer Dysart note in
their treatise, while in theory prosecutors have a burden to show an
independent source by "clear and convincing evidence" (in fact only
some of the jurisdictions mention such a burden), in practice, courts
"have gone to truly extraordinary lengths" to find that such
independent sources exist. 153 In fact, courts have found that the
eyewitness's original perception was an "independent" assurance of
the validity of the identification in remarkable cases where
eyewitnesses saw perpetrators for "less than ten seconds, running, at
night," or "while temporarily blinded by liquor," or when "choked from
154
behind."
Recall how in Wade, the Court recognized that unless the
courtroom identification is suppressed, a rule suppressing the out-ofcourt identification would serve little purpose since "[t]he State may
then rest upon the witnesses' unequivocal courtroom identifications."
At trial, litigating the "possible unfairness at the lineup may be the
sole
means
of attack
upon
the unequivocal
courtroom
'
155
identification." A Massachusetts appellate court highlighted:
We also note the obvious tactical reason for not filing a motion to suppress. If the out-ofcourt procedure was suppressed, leaving only an in-court identification, assuming the
Commonwealth was able to meet its burden, the defense 15would
not have been able to
6
exploit certain weaknesses in the identification procedure.

That may actually not be a good tactical reason to not file a motion to
suppress. If the Court suppresses the out-of-court identification, the
defense lawyer may still choose to introduce it, although the
identification cannot be presented by the State. It may be far more
favorable for the defense to introduce it to elicit how the in-court
identification is the product of a prior flawed identification procedure.
Regardless, the lenient treatment of in-court identifications means
that complete suppression of "all identification testimony" seldom
occurs (except maybe in rare cases where the eyewitness never had
any view of the culprit at all). 15 7 This creates poor general incentives
for the defense to vigorously litigate motions to suppress.

152. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968).
153. LOFrUS ET AL., supra note 21, at § 8-18, at 194-95.
154. Id. §8-18, at 194-95 & nn.108-09, 111 (citing cases).
155. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240-41 (1967).
156. Commonwealth v. Graham, No. 03-P-357, 2004 WL 840557, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr.
20, 2004).
157. Id.

2012]

EYEWITNESSES AND EXCLUSION

487

Why are courts so lax about courtroom identifications? Some of
those courts are aware of and cite to social science research on
eyewitness memory. It may simply not occur to them that the
courtroom identification is not just a bit of theater, but it is in fact
highly suggestive and influential to jurors. Judges may be used to
courtroom identifications of documents, nonstrangers, or objectscircumstances that are not problematic. Perhaps they believe that
"juries are inclined to be skeptical of courtroom identifications, on
account of the inherent suggestiveness in a defendant's location next
to his counsel at trial."158 As noted, they cite to the ability of counsel to
cross-examine after a courtroom identification. Or courts may be eager
to avoid excluding the identification, which may be central evidence
supporting the prosecution's case. Sandra Guerra Thompson suggests
that this may explain rulings in some states, pointing to, for example,
a New York Court of Appeals decision stating that "[e]xcluding
evidence of a suggestive show-up does not deprive the prosecutor of
reliable evidence of guilt. The witness would still be permitted to
identify the defendant in court if that identification is based on an
independent source." 159 Of course, that reluctance to exclude is most
problematic where the prior identifications were so suggestive that the
court recognizes that they should be excluded, but still admits the
courtroom identification.
There is an additional feature of the doctrine that is still more
problematic. Several state and federal courts add another guilt-based
factor nowhere to be found in the Manson test. They cite to other
evidence in the case as another "independent" basis for allowing the
in-court identification. They explain that all other unrelated evidence
of guilt in the case can buttress the eyewitness identification and help
to show that it was reliable or "independent" of any suggestive police
conduct. 160 In such cases, courts again short-circuit the due process
158. Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1049 (D.C. 2008) (citations omitted).
159. Thompson, supra note 21, at 627 (quoting People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y.
1981)).

160. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 925 So. 2d 878, 884 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the
testimony of three witnesses and the discovery of stolen property from the defendant's truck was
additional independent evidence); State v. Valentine, 785 A.2d 940, 943-44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) (finding evidence of independent reliability from the testimony of a witness, the
retrieval of a gun from the defendant's apartment, and the defendant's flight after officers
arrived constituted evidence that gave the identification independent reliability); see also
Suzannah B. Gambell, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable
Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189, 211 (2006) (discussing states that add
corroborative evidence of general guilt as a Biggers factor); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence,
Harmless Error and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 84-85 (citing
federal cases and noting, "The Supreme Court has not intervened as many of the circuits, taking
the hint from Manson, have made no secret of their holdings that corroborating evidence of guilt
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inquiry and do so for the explicit reason that they do not want to deny
the prosecution access to evidence against a likely guilty defendant. It
is an ends-justifying-the-means approach, and it is not an approach in
which "reliability is the linchpin."

III. A PARTIAL EXCLUSION APPROACH
Although judges may seek to avoid exclusion at all costs, there
is a middle ground that avoids excluding eyewitness testimony
entirely while still safeguarding the reliability of trial evidence. That
is to per se exclude courtroom identifications: ban them entirely when
prior identifications are conducted. At the same time, courts could
admit the prior identifications and allow any flaws in those procedures
to be explored by the defense when questioning the eyewitness.
Although the larger problem is beyond the scope of this Article, I
emphasize that policymakers and judges should also address the array
of deficiencies surrounding the admissibility rules for eyewitness
evidence. The Henderson decision in New Jersey, while not perfect,
provides a "social science framework" 161 for encouraging proper
lineups in the first instance, evaluating eyewitness evidence at
hearings pretrial, admitting them in court, and instructing jurors on
how to weight eyewitness identifications. 16 2
A. Limiting Courtroom Identifications
Some evidence, like that obtained after a search, can raise an
all or nothing question: Should the judge admit the evidence?
Moreover, the legality of the search has no bearing on the reliability of
the evidence; an illegal search can turn up damning evidence of guilt.
Other types of evidence lack such an all-or-nothing character. The
testimony of an eyewitness is complex. It can include, among other
things, a series of recollections, not all of which should necessarily be
admissible. As Gary Wells and Deah Quinlivan suggest, "[Tiotal
163
exclusion is not the only option."
can render an eyewitness identification 'reliable,' some even calling such independent evidence of
guilt a 'sixth factor' as to reliability"); Rudolf Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of
Corroborative Evidence in Due Process Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2003) ("[Clorroborative evidence of general guilt should be
considered only in any post-trial harmless error analysis.").
161. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in
Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
162. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 292-93 (N.J. 2011).
163. Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 32, at 20 (describing situations in which limiting
testimony might be appropriate).
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Commentators have argued that the Manson test should be
modified or that stronger limits should be placed on the admissibility
of identifications.1 64 I agree with those criticisms but argue that the
focus of such efforts should be broadened to not only revise (or scrap)
the due process and "reliability" test, but to also ask when courtroom
or subsequent identifications may be admitted despite earlier
suggestive procedures.' 65 I argue that courtroom identifications should
be per se excluded, perhaps with a heavy burden on the prosecution to
show why it is absolutely necessary. 166 After all, as courts
acknowledge, "the in-court testimony of an eyewitness can be
devastatingly persuasive,"' 167 and "of all the evidence that may be
presented to a jury, a witness'[s] in-court statement that he is the one
' 68
is probably the most dramatic and persuasive."'
Perhaps the eyewitness could still identify the defendant's
photo as the one previously identified in a photo array. Then again,
the police officer could just as readily authenticate the photo array as
the one administered and describe which photo was that of the
defendant. Particularly important is that the eyewitness would not be
permitted make an in-court identification of the defendant or
additional testify about confidence at the time of trial that the
identification is correct. As discussed, confidence on the day of trial is
not a sound measure of accuracy and is prejudicial. Allowing the
eyewitness to point to the defendant in the courtroom permits a
display of such confidence.
If the prior identification is not suppressed as unduly
suggestive, the eyewitness should be permitted to describe the out-ofcourt identification and be cross-examined concerning any suggestion
or unreliability of that procedure. As Justice Marshall put it,
164. See, e.g., O'Toole & Shay, supra note 1 at 136-38 (discussing need for alternative rule to
"discredited" Manson reliability checklist, and proposing rule that imposes minimum affirmative
guidelines for identification procedures); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating
Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1064-65 (2001) (discussing alternative rules that could counter injustices
of unreliable identifications).
165. Sandra Guerra Thompson, one of the few scholars to discuss the problematic standard,
has noted, "simply tightening the test for determining whether there is an independent basis
may not suffice to safeguard against the admission of unreliable in-court identifications."
Thompson, supranote 21, at 628.
166. Nor do I argue that in-court identifications should be barred as inherently suggestive,
as one commentator has. Mandery, supra note 39, at 392. Instead, I ask the question what
procedure should be used where prior lineups were conducted. Should police evade such a rule by
conducting no pretrial identification procedure at all, however, courts should exclude an in-court
identification as unnecessarily suggestive.
167. United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471, 475 (8th Cir. 1979).
168. United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1067 (6th Cir. 1976).
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dissenting in Manson, "[T]he issue is whether the witness is
identifying the defendant solely on the basis of his memory of 6vents
at the time of the crime, or whether he is merely remembering the
1 69
person he picked out in a pretrial procedure."
Such a rule would give police strong incentives to conduct
lineups and identification procedures before the trial. Regardless,
police have every reason to test an eyewitness's memory to be sure
that they have the right person. Indeed, in a typical case, they may
not be able to make an arrest since, without an eyewitness
identification, they would lack probable cause. Further, although
judges do not often order lineup procedures at a trial, as noted, when
they do, it is typically because the police did not conduct an
identification procedure before trial.
This approach could be seen as flowing from a strict reading of
Manson. One must separately ask whether the courtroom
identification is unduly suggestive or reliable. If an eyewitness
recounts a prior identification in the courtroom, then the eyewitness is
describing more reliable evidence. However, unless a lineup is
conducted in court, an identification in the courtroom is not only
inherently suggestive, but it is also less reliable. The courtroom
identification has no independent reliability, contrary to the language
adopted by so many state and federal courts. Courts simply get it
wrong when they suggest that there is less to be worried about when
the identification is conducted in court.170
Are there circumstances in which courtroom identifications
should be allowed, perhaps if prosecutors satisfied some burden in
showing that the identification was necessary? Certainly, if there was
no challenge to the courtroom identification, it could be allowed.
Routine identifications by a police officer of a person arrested or of a
relative or acquaintance are not controversial, and perhaps in such
circumstances no prior lineup would have been conducted. Nor are
those identifications based on an eyewitness's memory of a single
encounter. Police have separate written records of whom they arrest,
and the prior familiarity of a witness with a relative can similarly be
established without a courtroom identification.
A rule barring courtroom identifications encourages litigation
and development of the most probative eyewitness evidence. That is,
what happened at the initial identification? How certain was the

169. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 122 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700, 707-08 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that,
while the victim's identification of the defendants at trial was suggestive, it happened in the
presence of a jury and included a full and fair cross-examination of the victim about the process).
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eyewitness when first viewing the lineup? How was that initial lineup
conducted? Perhaps in part due to "independent source" case law, few
defendants contest in-court identifications. 1 71 The jurisprudence of
eyewitness
identifications
may itself improve
if separate
172
identifications are treated separately.
In some cases, there may not have been a prior identification.
Sometimes this may be because the identification was routine. The
police officer may identify the person whom she arrested, for example.
However, in a case involving a contested identification, the defense
should have, and in many jurisdictions will have, the ability to
formally request that a lineup be conducted before trial. If there is a
dispute about the reliability of an identification, the courtroom is no
place for an identification to first occur. Such an approach could be
adopted as to other aspects of eyewitness testimony as well. If police,
for example, fail to record the eyewitness's initial confidence upon
viewing a lineup, then at trial a judge could exclude as unreliable any
testimony about the witness's confidence.
B. Rethinking State Procedure
States are increasingly revisiting criminal procedure rules
regulating trial evidence, such as confessions, eyewitnesses, and
forensics, in response to scientific research and wrongful
convictions. 73 In each of those contexts, states must revisit rules for
excluding trial evidence. After all, if the new procedures are not
followed, the state law question arises whether an exclusionary rule
attaches to the breach. Typically, however, states have shied away
from specifying consequences for failure to follow such new criminal
procedures; thus, new statutes have tended not to speak to the
exclusion of an eyewitness identification should the court find that
best practices were not complied with. The two leading statutes, in
North Carolina and Ohio, provide that failure to comply with a set of
procedures, including double-blind and sequential administration of

171. See Mandery, supra note 39, at 389 ('The lack of appellate-level case law on the subject
may be partially explained by the fact that few defendants ever object to the suggestiveness of incourt identifications."). In contrast, I observe substantial appellate caselaw, which poses
additional obstacles to challenging in-court identifications.
172. Also problematic, some courts conduct a suppression hearing in front of the jury,
making a suppression remedy less effective. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981)
(holding that a trial court may conduct reliability hearings in presence of the jury); see also
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 143, § 24.4, at 1161 (noting that victims are typically not sequestered
at a criminal trial).
173. See GARRETT, supra note 7, ch. 9.
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lineups, "shall be considered" in a motion to suppress an
identification. 174 That is very mild language and a weak remedy.
State courts have also altered the Manson test to reform its
application. 175 For example, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded in
2005 that eyewitness certainty should no longer be considered as a
relevant factor when evaluating the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, stating that "[i]n the 32 years since the decision in Neil
v. Biggers, the idea that a witness's certainty in his or her
identification of a person as a perpetrator reflected the witness's
accuracy has been 'flatly contradicted by well-respected and
essentially unchallenged empirical studies.' "176 Yet, Georgia and
many other reform states are jurisdictions that adopt "independent
source" language for admitting in-court identifications. 177 States using
double-blind identifications similarly fail to discuss the standard for
excluding noncomplying or courtroom identifications. 178 Local efforts
174. The North Carolina statute provides: "(1) Failure to comply with any of the
requirements of this section shall be considered by the court in adjudicating motions to suppress
eyewitness identification." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52(d)(1) (West 2008). The Ohio
statute reads:
(1) Evidence of a failure to comply with any of the provisions of this section or with any
procedure for conducting lineups that has been adopted by a law enforcement agency or
criminal justice agency pursuant to division (B) of this section and that conforms to any
provision of divisions (B)(1) to (5) of this section shall be considered by trial courts in
adjudicating motions to suppress eyewitness identification resulting from or related to
the lineup.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83(C)(1) (West 2011).
175. Those states include Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York,
Massachusetts, Utah and Wisconsin. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991)
(altering three of the "reliability" factors to focus on effects of suggestion); see also State v.
Marquez, 967 A.2d 56, 69-71 (Conn. 2009) (adopting detailed criteria for assessing suggestion);
Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 & n.8 (Ga. 2005) (rejecting use of eyewitness certainty jury
instruction); State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 576 (Kan. 2003) (adopting Utah's five factor
"refinement" of the Biggers factors); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Mass.
1995) (adopting a per se exclusion approach to showup identifications); State v. Cromedy, 727
A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999) (requiring in some circumstances instruction on dangers of cross-racial
misidentifications); People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981) (adopting a per se
exclusion approach to showup identifications); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593-94 (Wis.
2005) ("[E]vidence obtained from an out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive and will not be
admissible unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary. A
showup will not be necessary, however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest
or, as a result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or photo
array.").
176. Brodes, 614 S.E.2d at 770.
177. See Kruse, supra note 21, at 722 n.367 ([A]lthough the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted a strict test regarding showups, "use of the independent-source doctrine runs the risk of
reintroducing the BrathwaitelBiggersreliability factors.")
178. See Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K Mehrkens Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving
Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County's Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y. & ETHICS J. 381, 405-410 (2006) (discussing benefits of double-blind
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similarly focus on best practices for eyewitness identifications without
1 79
discussing admissibility.
The one exception is the New Jersey Supreme Court's
Henderson decision adopting far-reaching changes to procedures
concerning eyewitness identifications.180 Those procedures are an
important model and provide a social science framework for
admissibility of eyewitness identifications. I note, though, that in
addition to certain other limitations, those procedures do not carefully
address the problem of courtroom identifications. Indeed, an appellate
decision in that case instructed the trial court to consider whether
there was an "independent source" for a courtroom identification
should the suggestive pretrial identifications be excluded. 1 8' On the
other hand, the Henderson decision does note that in "rare cases"
judges "may use their discretion to redact parts of identification
testimony," including by barring "potentially distorted and unduly
prejudicial statements about the witness's] level of confidence from
18 2
being introduced at trial."
Statutory jury instructions describing risks of eyewitness
18 3
misidentifications typically fail to consider admissibility standards.
administration and difficulties in its implementation, but not discussing exclusion of
noncomplying or courtroom identifications); Otto H. MacLin, Laura A. Zimmerman & Roy S.
Malpass, PC Eyewitness and Sequential Superiority Effect: Computer-Based Lineup
Administration, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 303, 305-308 (2005) (explaining how computer-based
lineup administration can reduce administrator bias, but not discussing noncomplying or
courtroom identifications); cf. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 21, § 4-10 (describing double-blind
administration in the context of lineups).
179. See, e.g., Report of the Task Force on Eyewitness Evidence, SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY, July 15, 2004, http://www.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/press-office/reports-and-officialcorrespondance/report-of-the-task-force-on-eyewitness-evidence/.
180. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 877-79 (N.J. 2011).
181. State v. Henderson, 937 A.2d 988, 999 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) ("[1If the
determinations made at the new Wade hearing require the exclusion of the out-of-court
identification made by Womble, then the judge should also determine whether Womble is able to
make an in-court identification of defendant from an independent source.").
182. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925.
183. North Carolina puts it as follows: "(3) When evidence of compliance or noncompliance
with the requirements of this section has been presented at trial, the jury shall be instructed
that it may consider credible evidence of compliance or noncompliance to determine the
reliability of eyewitness identifications." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52(d)(3) (West 2008).
The Ohio language is very similar:
(3) When evidence of a failure to comply with any of the provisions of this section, or
with any procedure for conducting lineups that has been adopted by a law enforcement
agency or criminal justice agency pursuant to division (B) of this section and that
conforms to any provision of divisions (B)(1) to (5) of this section, is presented at trial,
the jury shall be instructed that it may consider credible evidence of noncompliance in
determining the reliability of any eyewitness identification resulting from or related to
the lineup.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83(C)(3) (West 2011).
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As Justice Brennan wrote, "To expect a jury to engage in the collective
mental gymnastic of segregating and ignoring such testimony upon
instruction is utterly unrealistic."' 18 4 Research on jury instructions and
eyewitness testimony supports that view.18 5 This is all the more
problematic when a jury is given instructions that highlight factors
that do not correspond to the reliability of the identification or even
186
instructions on "independent source" for a courtroom identification.
However, as the Henderson decision explains, tailored jury
instructions highlighting factors relevant in a particular case, or even
provided just before the witness testifies, may have a greater ability to
educate jurors.1 8 7 More research should be done to study the effect of
such jury instructions.
Perhaps one reason that new procedures studiously avoid any
robust remedies for failure to adhere to best practices is a concern that
a heightened standard for exclusion would derail prosecutions that
rely on eyewitnesses as crucial evidence in serious cases. However, by
distinguishing between in-court and out-of-court identifications,
exclusion is no longer an all-or-nothing question. Judges could adopt a
rebuttable presumption that a courtroom identification would not be
allowed if earlier identification procedures were flawed, but they could
still allow full litigation of the prior procedures. Reforms should make
clear what consequences flow from a departure from best practices.
Again, the Henderson decision in New Jersey provides a roadmap for
how to structure those procedures.

184. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 356 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVE D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 11, 263-64 (1995) ("[T]he experiments we have

reviewed here provide little evidence that judges' instructions concerning the reliability of
eyewitness identification enhance juror sensitivity to eyewitness identification evidence.").
186. See supra note 131.
187. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 924 ("[Wie direct that enhanced instructions be given to guide
juries about the various factors that may affect the reliability of an identification in a particular
case."); see also Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 32, at 20-21 (discussing benefits of jury
instruction that is tailored to specifics of case). While jury instructions that seek to limit
consideration of evidence and "blindfold" the jury may fail, efforts to more completely inform the
jury using instructions that explain rationales for admonitions may produce more accurate
results. See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE SELECTED RULES
OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY: REGULATION OF EVIDENCE TO PROMOTE EXTRINSIC POLICIES AND

VALUES § 1.11.5 (2010) (explaining that jury instructions should clearly convey both the
applicable legal rules and the importance of abiding by them); Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil
Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1858 (2001)
(discussing limits of blindfolding techniques given active nature of juries and advocating for
reason-based explanatory instructions). On the value of offering instructions earlier in the trial,
see Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understandingthe Limits of Limiting Instructions:Social
Psychological Explanations for the Failuresof Instructions to DisregardPretrial Publicity and
Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677, 705 (2000).
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Judges could partially reorient the jurisprudence just by
correctly reading Manson. The Court's due process test does not
include an "independent source" rule. It requires separate analysis of
whether a given identification procedure should be admitted as
suggestive or reliable. A courtroom identification is not a "reliable"
test of the eyewitness's memory, and a courtroom identification is
inherently suggestive. Similarly, statutes could codify per se exclusion
for courtroom identifications that follow prior out-of-court
identification procedures.
Criminal procedure rules could more broadly focus on
excluding tainted aspects of evidence, such as a confession, an
informant statement, or a forensic report, without imposing an all-ornothing exclusion. The Supreme Court in Perry was unwilling to
expand due process regulation of eyewitness identifications not
arranged by police, but the Court did emphasize that jury instructions
and other tools may more usefully ensure the reliability of trial
evidence.1 88 However, the Court may continue to step back toward a
more reliability-oriented Confrontation Clause approach.1 8 9 The
Court's ruling in Missouri v. Siebert can also be seen as a ruling
recognizing the need to partially exclude later evidence contaminated
by earlier evidence (although there, the focus was on police coercion
and not on reliability). 190 An approach geared toward reliability might
instead look at whether a confession was contaminated by disclosed
facts, and it might exclude portions of an interrogation where the
suspect was not volunteering answers but simply repeating

188. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 727-28 (2012).
189. None of the examples discussed above necessarily involve absent witnesses and thus
can avoid Confrontation Clause problems. The Supreme Court had earlier adopted a reliabilityoriented approach to the Confrontation Clause problem, permitting nonconfrontation of
witnesses if the evidence was reliable or had "particular guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The Court rejected that approach in Crawford v. Washington,
focusing instead on whether the evidence was testimonial in nature. 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
However, the Court's recent ruling on the "excited utterance" and "ongoing emergency" exception
to hearsay returned to a reliability rationale, noting "the prospect of fabrication" is greatly
diminished when a person is seeking law enforcement help. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143,
1157 (2011).
190. 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004) (plurality opinion). In Siebert, the Court ruled that when
police interrogate a suspect in custody without having given the Miranda warnings, but then
after obtaining a confession, give the warnings and ask the same questions again, that the
repeated statement is not admissible. Id. at 604. The plurality emphasized that that the earlier
statement, made without the Miranda warnings, would naturally impact the second statement.
Id. at 613-14. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in dissent, the Court also considered the
"psychological impact" the first unwarned statement would have on the second Mirandized
statement. Id. at 627 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She would consider the same factors, but for a
different purpose, to ask whether the second statement might be independently reliable and
therefore not subject to exclusion. Id. at 627-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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information that police provided, 191 or it might simply exclude portions
of an interrogation that were not electronically recorded. 192 Similarly,
a series of courts have responded to challenges to the validity and
reliability of a series of forensic techniques, such as fingerprint
analysis, firearms and toolmark analysis, and handwriting
comparisons, by limiting the ability of analysts to testify to invalid
conclusions, such as that the evidence could only have come from the
defendant to the exclusion of all others in the world. 193 As courts and
legislatures focus on reliability in other contexts, they might consider
whether evidence could similarly be treated in separate parts. In
addition, courts could fashion tailored jury instructions, together with

191. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051,
1109-11 (2010) (arguing that constitutional criminal procedure should consider reliability and,
in particular, should assess whether suspects actually volunteered crucial facts).
192. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22(3)(a)-(c) (West 2011) (stating that "[n]o
oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be
admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless" there is an "electronic recording"
made of it, although containing an exception for "any statement which contains assertions of
facts or circumstances that are found to be true and which conduce to establish the guilt of the
accused, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property or the instrument with which he states
the offense was committed"). Such rules raise additional questions. For example, that Texas
statute does not offer a remedy in the situation in which statements were selectively recorded.
Id. In addition, while the statute exempts certain unrecorded corroborated admissions, it does
not make clear that recorded statements be excluded should they document police contamination
of the confession or other evidence of unreliability. Id.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107-109, 120 (D. Mass. 2005)
(limiting firearms comparison testimony to conclusions expressing similarities and, interestingly,
analogizing the problem of observer bias of a firearms examiner given only a single firearm to
examine to the problem of showup eyewitness identifications); United States v. Hines, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 62, 67-68 (D. Mass. 1999) (ruling that handwriting examiner was limited to testifying
about "similarities" in documents); see also Simon A. Cole, Splitting Hairs? Evaluating 'Split
Testimony' as an Approach to the Problem of Forensic Expert Evidence, 33 SIDNEY L. REV. 459
(2011) (evaluating emerging approach by courts restricting testimonial claims of forensic
experts); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 75
BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1242 (2010) (arguing that as an "interim solution" courts limit fingerprint
evidence "by restricting it to description of similarities and differences" rather than permit
individualization claims); Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the
Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 750 (2011) ("Forensic analysts have often failed to
recognize the limits of what conclusions are actually warranted by a given research result.");
David M. Siegel et al., The Reliability of Latent Print Individualization:Brief of Amici Curiae
submitted on Behalf of Scientists and Scholars by The New England Innocence Project,
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 42 CRIM. L, BULL. art. 2 (2006) ("[Tlestimony in terms of
'individualization' or 'matches,' without the underlying study of the base rates of the
characteristics from which such conclusions are ostensibly drawn, or proficiency tests data for
examiners, is misleading and fundamentally unsound. This does not mean that testimony
detailing the comparison of prints by examiners would have to be excluded."); cf Simon A. Cole,
Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking About Expert Evidence as Expert Testimony, 52
VILL. L. REV. 803, 838 (2007) ("[J]udges and legal scholars need to shift their focus from the
admissibility of evidence to control of testimony.").
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reliability hearings, to provide a comprehensive framework regulating
the admissibility of evidence.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's due process test, confused in the courts
by misplaced borrowing from Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel cases
and Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule doctrine, has handled
exclusion and eyewitness identifications backwards. Most recently, the
Court blithely noted in Perry v. New Hampshire that "all in-court
identifications" involve "some elements of suggestion," identifying this
as one reason to leave the problem of unreliable eyewitness
identification evidence to the states and to jurors.194 Yet, state courts
permit courtroom displays to obscure the reliability of eyewitness
identifications and to mislead the jury. From tangled origins in the
Court's rulings, the doctrine developed in an odd and unforeseen way.
Almost without exception in state courts, a judge may find that the
courtroom identification has an "independent source" or has
"independent reliability" based on the eyewitness's memory of what
she saw. There is nothing independent about the courtroom
identification. Eyewitness memory is not "independent" of prior events
and courts do not have "independent" access to the memory of an
eyewitness. If the prior procedures were suggestive, then, at
minimum, the courtroom identification should be per se excluded.
In contrast, evidence law recognizes in a host of ways that
evidence can be separated into parts for admissibility purposes.
Eyewitnesses typically confront multiple identification procedures, in
court and out of court. Evidence rules admit prior identifications,
which far better capture the eyewitness's memory. What evidence
rules do not do, however, is relegate courtroom identifications to a
least-favored status. As a result, the ready use of courtroom
identifications has frustrated efforts to reform eyewitness
identifications in response to decades of social science research and
troubling lessons from DNA exonerations. Now that judges and
legislatures have begun to reshape eyewitness identification law, a
partial exclusion approach could play an important role. The
regulation of eyewitness identifications should start with the
fundamental requirement that law enforcement follow best practices
when conducting identification procedures in the first instance, and it
could include per se exclusion of courtroom identifications that follow
prior identifications. Perhaps then criminal procedure rules will
194. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2012).
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accomplish their goal of safeguarding the reliability of eyewitness
identifications. Until the doctrine is reoriented, courtroom
identifications will undermine due process jurisprudence and obscure
the reliable evidence that eyewitnesses can provide to our criminal
justice system.
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APPENDIX

States Citing to Independent Source Rules for Admissibility of InCourt Eyewitness Identifications
Alabama
See Hull v. State, 581 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ("[T]he
suggestiveness of the identification procedures must be balanced
against factors indicating that the in-court identification was
independently reliable." (citing Dickerson v. Fogg, 692 F.2d 238, 244
(2d Cir. 1982))); Speigner v. State, 369 So. 2d 39, 42 (Ala. Crim. App.
1979) ("[W]here allegations are made that the due process standards
were violated by an unfair pretrial confrontation, it becomes the
burden of the prosecution to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the in-court identification testimony had an independent source
and did not stem from the alleged unfair pretrial confrontation.").
Alaska
See Gipson v. State, 575 P.2d 782, 787 (Alaska Ct. App. 1978) ("The

foregoing evidence of identification, which we consider overwhelming,
had an 'independent source' from the tainted in-court identification
which occurred at the first preliminary hearing."); Gruber v. State,
1984 WL 908688, at *2,n.2 (Alaska App. 1984) (stating that an "incourt identification is admissible, even if the photographic display was
suggestive, if it stems from his memory of the assault independent of
the suggestive display" (emphasis in original)).
Arizona
See State v. Marquez, 558 P.2d 692, 695 (Ariz. 1976) ("If the record
shows that a pre-trial identification was unduly suggestive, then the
in-court identification must be shown to have had an independent
source other than the improper pre-trial identification.").
Arkansas
See Van Pelt v. State, 816 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ark. 1991) ("Even had the
pre-trial identification been impermissibly suggestive, the taint of an
improper 'show-up' was removed by the clear and convincing evidence
that the in-court identification was based upon [the witness's]
independent observations of the suspect.").
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California
See People v. Cooks, 190 Cal. Rptr. 211, 270 (Ct. App. 1983) ("In
California, the burden shifts to the People to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based on the
witness'[s] observations of the accused at the scene of the crime, that
is, independent of the suggestive pretrial identification.").
Colorado
See People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 119 (Colo. 1983) ("The People
have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that
in-court identification is not the product of an unduly suggestive
confrontation, but is based upon the witness'[s] independent
observations of the defendant during the commission of the crime.").
Connecticut
See State v. Doolittle, 455 A.2d 843, 851 (Conn. 1983) (citing to the
courtroom identification as "a strong independent source for the
identification of the defendant as the robber apart from the photo
identifications").
Florida
See Allen v. State, 326 So. 2d 419, 410 (Fla. 1975) ('Viewing the trial
testimony of the witnesses in its entirety, there were sufficient
independent sources for the in-court identification. There is nothing in
the record that shows the in-court identification was tainted by the
prior improper out-of-court identification procedure.").
Georgia
See Sharp v. State, 692 S.E.2d 325, 330 (Ga. 2010) ("[E]ven if an outof-court identification is impermissibly suggestive, a subsequent incourt identification is admissible if it did not depend upon the prior
identification[ ] but had an independent origin." (internal quotations
omitted)); Shabazz v. State, 667 S.E.2d 414, 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
("[E]ven a 'right guy' reference will not taint a subsequent in-court
identification if that identification 'does not depend upon the prior
identification but has an independent source.' ").
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Idaho
See State v. Sadler, 511 P.2d 806, 813 (Idaho 1973) ("Since the
witness's in-court identification had an independent origin exclusive of
any connection with events occurring in the police station, we conclude
that the trial court properly admitted this identification into
evidence." (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
Illinois
See People v. DeJesus, 516 N.E.2d 801, 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("If a
violation of a defendant's rights is found, the court must then
determine whether the in-court identification nevertheless is
admissible because it has an independent source.").
Indiana
See Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221, 225 (Ind. 1991) ("This Court has
repeatedly held, however, that 'an in-court identification by a witness
who has participated in an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court
identification is admissible if the witness has an independent basis for
the in-court identification.' ").
Iowa
See State v. Webb, 516 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1994) ("We have stated
that even where a pretrial identification is obtained by an illegal
procedure, 'the same witness may nevertheless identify a defendant at
trial if such identification has an independent origin ... '" (quoting
State v. Ash, 244 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1976))).
Kansas
See State v. Skelton, 795 P.2d 349, 356 (Kan. 1990) ("[A]n in-court
identification is capable of standing on its own even though a pretrial
confrontation was deficient.").
Louisiana
See State v. Cheathon, 682 So. 2d 823, 826 (La. App. 1996) ("In the
present case, even if we disregard the contrary evidence and assume
arguendo that the pre-trial
identification
represented an
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impermissibly suggestive activity, the record discloses an independent
basis for admitting the in-court identifications by the two victims.").
Maine
See State v. Broucher, 388 A.2d 907, 909 (Me. 1978) (analyzing "(1)
whether the pre-trial identifications were so suggestive as to be
inherently unreliable; and (2) if so, whether the in-court identification
had an independent source").
Massachusetts
See Commonwealth v. Delrio, 2003 WL 21028648, at *8 (Mass. Super.
2003) ("Notwithstanding the suppression of the identification
following the showup, the witness should be permitted to make an in
court identification based on the doctrine of independent source.").
Michigan
See People v. Gray, 577 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Mich. 1998) ("Our inquiry does
not end once we have found an invalid identification procedure. The
second step in our analysis is to determine whether the victim had an
independent basis to identify the defendant in court.").
Minnesota
See State v. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn. 1999) ("[I]f the
totality of the circumstances shows the witness'[s] identification has
an adequate independent origin, it is considered to be reliable despite
the suggestive procedure." (quoting State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916,
921 (Minn. 1995))).
Mississippi
See Lattimore v. State, 958 So. 2d 192, 198 (Miss. 2007) ("Where
constitutional error in pre-trial identification has occurred, the state
must show by clear and convincing evidence that subsequent in-court
identifications are not based upon the offensive lineup, but instead
have an independent origin.").
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Missouri
See State v. Gates, 637 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("The
question remains, therefore, whether the prelineup eyewitness
identification was sufficiently reliable as an independent source for
the trial identification . . . ."); State v. Morgan, 593 S.W.2d 256, 258
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("The presence of an independent source will serve
to remove any taint that might result from a suggestive
confrontation." (quoting State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975))).
Nebraska
See State v. Smith, 696 N.W.2d 871, 883 (Neb. 2005) ("An in-court
identification may properly be received in evidence when it is
independent of and untainted by illegal pretrial identification
procedures .... " (quoting State v. Auger, 262 N.W.2d 187, 189 (Neb.
1978))).
Nevada
See Hicks v. State, 605 P.2d 219, 221 (Nev. 1980) ("Moreover, the
[witness] made independent, positive, and unequivocal in-court
identifications of [defendant] at the preliminary examination and trial
which were sufficient to render any possible error in the photographic
identification procedure harmless.").
New Hampshire
See State v. Preston, 442 A.2d. 992, 994-95 (N.H. 1982) ("Once an outof-court identification has been suppressed, in order for a subsequent
in-court identification to be allowed, the State must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that 'the in-court identification ha[d] an
independent source and [was] not influenced by the out-of-court
viewing. .. .") (quoting State v. Leclair, 385 A.2d 831, 835 (1978))).
New Jersey
See State v. Peterkin, 543 A.2d 466, 476 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) ("[T]he State should bear the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that any in-court identification . . . is derived
from an independent source.").
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New Mexico
See State v. Leyba, 2009 WL 6608373, at *4 (N.M. 2009) (deciding that
a trial court should "hear and consider testimony regarding the
suggestive context, the reasons for any suggestivity, and whether or
not, as in this case, there may have been an independent source for a
reliable courtroom identification.").
New York
See People v. Dell, 784 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (App. Div. 2004) ("The
testimony at an independent source hearing established that the
victims had multiple opportunities to observe the defendant at close
range for a lengthy period of time during the commission of the crime.
Therefore, the Supreme Court correctly determined that there was an
independent source for the identifications.").
North Carolina
See State v. Freeman, 330 S.E.2d 465, 471 (N.C. 1985) ("[W]e need not
decide whether the improper display of the photographs to the State's
witnesses by one other than the State tainted their in-court
identifications. This is so because the trial judge concluded that the
witnesses' in-court identifications of defendant were of 'independent
origin, based solely upon what the witnesses saw at the time of the
crime.' ").
Ohio
See State v. Jenksin, 2004 WL 63937, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) ("This
court has held that, even presuming a pretrial identification procedure
is impermissibly suggestive, an in-court identification is permissible
where the prosecution establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that the witness had a reliable, independent basis for the
identification based on prior independent observations made at the
scene of the crime."); State v. Moss, 1989 WL 10253, at *10 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989) ("[W]e find that these eyewitnesses had an independent
source for their in-court identifications.").
Oregon
See State v. Lawson, 244 P.3d 860, 866 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (asking
"whether the identification had a source independent of the suggestive
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review allowed, 258 P.3d 526 (Or.

Pennsylvania
See Commonwealth v. McGaghey, 507 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. 1986)
(stating that the judge must examine whether "the in-court
identification resulted from the criminal act and not the suggestive
encounter"); Commonwealth v. Bradford, 451 A.2d 1035, 1037 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982) ("A consideration of the totality of the circumstances
in this case leads us to conclude that the identification testimony
supplied by the victim at the trial was sufficiently independent of the
suggestive pre-trial identification procedure that had been employed
by the police.").
South Carolina
See State v. Carlson, 611 S.E.2d 283, 290 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) ("The
in-court identification is admissible if based on information
independent of the out-of-court procedure.").
South Dakota
See State v. Iron Necklace, 430 N.W.2d 66, 84 (S.D. 1988) ("[The proof
shifts to the State to then prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the in-court identification had an independent origin.").
Texas
See Buxton v. State, 699 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
("[W]e find the in-court identification was shown to have an origin
independent from the lineup.").
Virginia
See McCary v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 645 (Va. 1984) ("We
conclude that the in-court identifications had independent sources free
from taint, specifically the ample opportunities the victims availed
themselves of to observe [the Defendant] in his activities before and
during the crimes.").
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Washington
See State v. Johnson, 132 P.3d 767, 769 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) ("Even
if an identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, courts
will uphold an in-court identification if it has an 'independent source.'
1).

West Virginia
See State v. Watson, 318 S.E.2d 603, 613 (W.Va. 1984) (holding that a
court must ask "if the witness had an independent basis for his
identification other than an impermissible out-of-court identification").
Wisconsin
See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 596 (Wis. 2005) ("The witness
would still be permitted to identify the defendant in court if that
identification is based on an independent source." (quoting People v.
Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1981))); Powell v. State, 271
N.W.2d 610, 617 (Wis. 1978) ("[T]he state has the burden of showing
that the subsequent in-court identification derived from an
independent source and was thus free of taint.").
Washington, D.C.
Collins v. United States, 491 A.2d 480, 489 (D.C. 1985) (noting that
the judge found "independent source" for lineup and in-court
identifications).

